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SECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 Immigrants account for a disproportionate percentage of those in Germany who 
are registered as unemployed or receive welfare benefits, based upon their share of the 
population. In 2006, for instance, immigrants comprised thirty-four percent of all welfare 
recipients but only twenty percent of the population (Thomsen and Walter, 2010).  
Additionally, between 1985 and 1993 the number of foreigners receiving unemployment 
benefits increased by roughly three hundred percent, compared to an increase of only 
twenty percent for natives (Bauer, Dietz, Zimmermann and Zwintz, 2005).  
 
 Statistics of this nature confirm that immigrants constitute a crucial welfare 
constituency which, as a bloc, struggles to remain mobilized in the German labor market 
more so than native workers. This native-immigrant gap in employment prospects has 
been studied extensively both in the international literature and in Germany. A host of 
factors have been identified by researchers as potential causes of this difference in 
employment prospects, including, but not limited to, the lack of transferability of human 
capital from the origin country, discrimination in the labor market, and enclave effects 
resulting from a lack of assimilation into the host country.  
 
 Germany's strong welfare state and complement of active labor market programs 
(ALMP) have shown rich but varied successes in mobilizing the difficult-to-employ, yet 
have never been tailored to address the specific needs of disadvantaged immigrant 
laborers (Jann, 2010; Thomsen and Walter, 2010).  
 
 This paper empirically examines the effectiveness of one aspect of Germany's 
active labor market policy spectrum, specifically, start-up grants to the unemployed. In 
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2004, public spending on self-employment promotion comprised nearly seventeen 
percent of all ALMP spending in Germany (Caliendo and Künn, 2010). Previous research 
has found that these start-up grants significantly improve the employment prospects and 
earnings profiles of entrepreneurs who rise out of unemployment (Baumgartner and 
Caliendo, 2008).  
 
 Self-employment has long been identified as an important avenue for immigrants 
and other disadvantaged groups in overcoming human capital deficiencies and 
discrimination in the labor market (see e.g. Constant, Shachmurove and Zimmermann, 
2005). Additionally, immigrants in Germany and elsewhere have been found, in many 
instances, to achieve earnings parity with native laborers through entrepreneurial ventures 
(see e.g. Constant, 1998). However, the provision of public start-up grants as a means to 
incentivize otherwise-disadvantaged immigrants has scarcely been examined via 
systematic empirical evaluation.   
 
 This paper uses the German Socioeconomic Panel, provided by the German 
Institute for Economic Research (DIW-Berlin) and Cornell University, and analyzes the 
extent to which public self-employment promotion mobilizes unemployed immigrants 
into stable employment. If successful in improving the labor market prospects of such 
immigrants, self-employment promotion offers the German welfare state a prime 
opportunity to narrow the immigrant-native employment gap.  
  
 The remaining portions of this paper are broken down into several sections. 
Section Two briefly summarizes Germany’s rich migration history since World War II, 
noting the composition of various migrant cohorts that still reside in Germany. Section 
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Three addresses the labor market behavior of these immigrants, focusing on the factors 
that lead these individuals into more frequent unemployment and welfare usage. Section 
Four discusses the propensity for immigrants to become self-employed, the legal status of 
such self-employment, and the process through which immigrants use self-employment 
to become successful participants in the labor market.  
 Section Five addresses the specific public self-employment promotion programs 
offered by the German government in recent times, and analyzes the existing evidence on 
the success of such programs and others abroad. Lastly, Sections Six and Seven describe 
and complete an empirical analysis of these programs, with a focus on their success for 
immigrant laborers compared to natives. Section Eight concludes this paper and 
summarizes the results of the analysis, focusing on the policy prospects for future active 
labor market programs in Germany.  
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SECTION TWO: GERMANY’S HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION 
 
 During the 1980s and 1990s, German government policy on immigration was 
markedly clear, “the Federal Republic of Germany is not, nor shall it become, a country 
of immigration,” and asserted that, “restricting non-EC [European Community] 
immigration is necessary to safeguard social peace and to integrate the aliens already in 
Germany” (Martin, 1998).  
 
 Despite this strongly worded anti-migrant rhetoric, Germany has actually 
experienced a rich and diverse history of immigration, including significant guest-worker 
importation following World War II, strong family reunification policies, ethnic return 
migration, and liberal asylum laws. In fact, Germany has long been accepted as the chief 
destination in Europe for refugees.  
 
 There exists a disconnect between the acknowledged history of migration in the 
country and the actual composition of its population. Phillip Martin of the University of 
California at San Diego therefore labels Germany “a reluctant land of immigration,” 
where “international obligations, historical factors, and economic needs…make it 
difficult for Germany to quickly or easily stop immigration,” yet, “many politicians do 
not want to develop an immigration system for Germany that anticipates the arrival of 
newcomers” (Martin, 1998).  
 
 Within the past ten years, the German government has moved closer towards 
acknowledging the full extent of its immigration history. The 2005 Immigration Act, 
under Chancellor Angela Merkel’s direction, addressed several key areas of immigration 
policy long in need of review, including Germany’s asylum procedure, residence permit 
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process, stipulations on the subsequent immigration of dependents, and the integration of 
immigrants upon arrival in Germany (Auswärtiges Amt, 2005; Bundesministerium des 
Innern, 2005). 
 
 This portion of the analysis will briefly summarize Germany’s migration policies 
since 1945, seeking to understand the nature and labor market prospects of the myriad 
immigrant groups that currently reside in Germany. Bauer, Dietz, Zimmermann and 
Zwintz (2005) identify three broad periods of migration since 1945 in Germany, which 
will guide the organization of this section.  
 
Phase One: Manpower Recruitment (1955-1973) 
 Following World War II and financed by American coffers, West Germany 
embarked upon a massive infrastructure and industrial rebuilding process beginning in 
the 1950s and onward. Initially, the return migration of many ethnic Germans who had 
fled the country supplied the requisite labor for the developing economy. But by 1955, 
this high economic growth had caused a relative shortage of low-skilled laborers, and 
Germany began to pursue an active labor recruitment policy from abroad (Bauer, Dietz, 
Zimmermann and Zwintz, 2005).  
 
 From 1955-1968, West Germany signed recruitment treaties with various 
Southern European countries including Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey, and 
also recruited from North Africa. The government opened recruitment offices in these 
countries to identify laborers willing to migrate to Germany to fuel the post-war boom, 
and directly sought out cheap laborers willing to up and move for guaranteed wages. 
	   7	  
 These guest-workers were provided residence permits generally for one year at a 
time, a policy meant to maintain the temporary nature of this migration (Bauer, Dietz, 
Zimmermann and Zwintz, 2005).  Originally selected by the recruitment offices “because 
they were similar to blue-collar workers”, and paid upon arrival with wages comparable 
to those of natives, these migrants faced very few incentives to assimilate into the regular 
German economy (Zimmermann, 2005).  
 
 Between 1955 and 1973, the foreign population in West Germany increased from 
500,000 (0.9 percent of total population) to roughly four million people (6.4 percent of 
total population) (Bauer, Dietz, Zimmermann and Zwintz, 2005). Thousands of these 
migrants, following completion of their work permits, applied and were granted 
permanent residency in West Germany without citizenship (Dustmann, 1996). Former 
guest-workers form the backbone of the immigrant population in Germany to this day. 
 
 By 1973, 2.6 million foreigners were employed in West Germany, comprising 
around twelve percent of the entire labor force (Dustmann, 1996).  However, at the height 
of guest-worker employment in 1973, the country was struck with the damaging effects 
of the first crippling oil crisis. On November 23rd of that same year, the Federal Labor 
Office ended all recruitment of foreign workers in light of increasing social tensions at 
home and fears of recession (Bauer, Lofstrom and Zimmermann, 2000). This cessation of 
labor recruitment led West Germany into its next phase of migration, one of restraint and 
consolidation of previous policies. 
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Phase Two: Restrained Migration (1974-1988) 
 In the wake of the inflationary oil crises of the early 1970s, West Germany altered 
its migration policies away from inviting laborers into the economy, and limited its 
migrant inflows to individuals with little human capital who would scarcely compete for 
the reduced number of jobs available to current laborers already in Germany (Boeri, 
Hanson, and McCormick, 2002).  
 
 With thousands of temporary migrants now permanently residing in the country, 
the West German government began to allow the in-migration of dependents of these 
former guest-workers (who were mostly men), in hopes of easing the assimilation process 
of such workers into the regular economy and society. With many immigrant families 
reunited during this period, a rather high fertility rate emerged among the foreign 
population within Germany (Bauer, Dietz, Zimmermann and Zwintz, 2005). The children 
of such migrants have long been remarked to face similar assimilation problems, 
achieving low educational attainment (see e.g. Riphahn, 2001) and poor German 
language skills much like their parents (see e.g. Frick and Wagner, 2001)  
 
 The West German government attempted to induce the return migration of many 
of these former guest-workers as early as 1972, when a bilateral treaty with Turkey was 
signed offering education, financial, and business start-up support for Turks who agreed 
to return to their country-of-origin (Bauer, Dietz, Zimmermann, and Zwintz, 2005). A 
comprehensive return policy was not achieved until 1983, when the government under 
then-newly elected Chancellor Helmut Kohl began to offer financial incentives and 
reduced mobility barriers to foreigners who intended to remigrate to a former recruitment 
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treaty country. This program showed mild short-term success through 1984, but by 1985, 
net-migration was positive once again. (Bauer, Dietz, Zimmermann, and Zwintz, 2005). 
 
 Further immigration was permitted for ethnic Germans returning primarily from 
Poland, Romania, and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Aussiedler). This 
flow of immigrants increased after 1975, peaked in the early 1980s, but has decreased 
since. (Bauer, Dietz, Zimmermann and Zwintz, 2005). These ethnic Germans have been 
more successfully assimilated into the regular German economy than former guest-
workers (Zimmermann, 2005).  
 
 During this time period, the foreign worker share dropped slightly, but remained 
around ten percent of the labor force through the 1980s, which marked the beginning of a 
massive asylum immigration campaign that would transform Germany into the chief 
destination for asylum applicants and refugees in Europe.  
 
Phase Three: Post-Reunification (1988-Present) 
 Article Sixteen of the German Constitution states that political refugees have the 
right to seek asylum in Germany. This liberally-phrased asylum policy was scarcely used 
until the 1980s, but by 1992, Germany was receiving 500,000 asylum applicants per year 
(Bauer, Dietz, Zimmermann and Zwintz, 2005). In comparison, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees estimates that only 700,000 asylum applications were 
received in all of Europe in 1992 (Dustmann, 1996).  
 
 This increase in asylum applicants to Germany has been attributed to increased 
conflicts on the African continent, as well as political confusion and general unrest which 
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spread quickly throughout the former Soviet bloc states of Eastern Europe (Bauer, Dietz, 
Zimmermann and Zwintz, 2005). Arguably in response to the drastic increase in the 
utilization of Article Sixteen, Germany adopted an amendment to the asylum policy in 
1993 which allowed the forced return of those asylum seekers who arrived from countries 
within the European Union or other states designated as safe and stable. This change 
hedged the flow of asylum migrants into Germany down to around 120,000 in 1995 
(Bauer, Dietz, Zimmermann and Zwintz, 2005), comprising approximately forty to fifty 
percent of all asylum migrants in Europe (Bauer, Lofstrom, and Zimmermann, 2000).  
 In 1990, vast lateral migrant flows occurred following German reunification, with 
many East Germans (Übersiedler) moving into the West upon the fall of the German 
Democratic Republic. In-migration during this period, and the previous period of family 
reunification and ethnic resettling, was not sensitive to the ebb and flow of the business 
cycle, unlike the growth-driven migration of the initial phase of foreign population 
growth. These recent immigrants arrived not with a specific employment prospect in 
mind, but rather with a desire to improve their wellbeing compared to their country-of-
origin. As a result, they entered the German labor market at a relative disadvantage to the 
earlier migrants, who arrived and immediately began working. Since the 1990s, the 
divide between the unemployment rate of foreign workers and natives has 
correspondingly widened (Bauer, Dietz, Zimmermann and Zwintz, 2005). This 
observation, that foreign workers appear to be more unemployed than native workers, 
allows us to now proceed into a greater discussion of the labor market prospects of the 
various immigrant cohorts discussed herein.  
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SECTION THREE: LABOR MARKET STRUGGLES OF IMMIGRANTS 
 Boeri, Hanson, and McCormick (2002) identify several “stylized facts” which 
summarize the socio-economic conditions of migrants living within the European Union, 
several of which relate to immigrants in the labor market. Specifically, migrants tend to 
concentrate in large cities, affecting the type and scope of employment opportunities 
available to them as workers. The skill levels of migrants are well below those of the 
native population, and the occupational status of immigrants lags well behind the 
occupational status of natives with comparable skill levels. In Germany, migration is 
indeed concentrated in large industrial and service centers such as Frankfurt and 
Stuttgart, where immigrants account for roughly thirty percent of the population, as well 
as medium-sized cities in the southern portions of Germany in Baden-Württemberg and 
the manufacturing areas in the Ruhrgebiet. Regarding the sectoral distribution of these 
migrants, roughly equal proportions work in manufacturing and service with trivial 
amounts working in agriculture.  
 
The Immigrant-Native Unemployment Gap 
 The average labor market performance of immigrants in Germany has worsened 
significantly over time. Following the 1973 cessation of recruitment policies, the 
remaining immigrants who continued to arrive in Germany were primarily low-skilled 
and ill-equipped to join the labor market. In recent years, the unemployment rate of 
foreign workers, both male and female, has deviated above and beyond the ordinary 
business cycle fluctuations experienced by natives. Table One provides some recent data 
from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on 
unemployment rates in Germany for native-born laborers and foreign-born laborers. 
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TABLE ONE: UNEMPLOYMENT RATES BETWEEN NATIVES AND FOREIGNERS 
  Native-Born Foreign-Born Difference 
2000 7.39% 12.56% 5.20% 
2005 9.91% 17.70% 7.80% 
2006 9.37% 16.54% 7.20% 
Total Population 
2007 7.84% 14.29% 6.40% 
2000 6.92% 12.90% 6.00% 
2005 10.60% 17.50% 6.90% 
2006 9.40% 16.60% 7.20% 
Males 
2007 7.66% 14.91% 7.30% 
2000 7.97% 12.06% 4.10% 
2005 10.20% 16.30% 6.10% 
2006 9.30% 15.80% 6.50% 
Females 
2007 8.05% 13.51% 5.50% 
Source: OECD Stat 
 
 First, note that in all years reported, foreign-born workers are more frequently 
unemployed than the native-born. This problem is not simply persistent and lingering, but 
it is growing. In the year 2000, foreign-born laborers were 5.2% more likely to be 
unemployed than natives; yet only seven years later, that gap had worsened to a 6.4% 
difference. The unemployment gap was especially pronounced in 2005, when native-born 
workers remained in single-digit unemployment, but an overwhelming 17.7% of foreign-
born individuals were out of work.  
 
 Many researchers have identified this exact phenomenon in Germany and 
similarly in other immigration countries abroad (see e.g. Zimmermann, Kahanec, 
Constant, DeVoretz, Gataullina, and Zaiceva, 2008; Thomsen and Walter, 2010). 
Foreign-born workers are at a disadvantage in terms of finding sustainable employment. 
Boeri, Hanson, and McCormick (2002) find that migrants in Germany are not only more 
frequently unemployed, but they remain longer in those unemployment spells than 
natives. Uhlendorff and Zimmermann (2006) note that migrants take significantly more 
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time than comparable natives to find stable employment. These findings suggest that jobs 
for immigrants are either harder to come by in general, or that migrants operate with 
higher search costs and/or lower search ability than natives. Of those migrants in 
Germany who do find employment, several studies have found that they face a strong 
earnings disadvantage over natives once employed. For instance, Aldashev, Gernandt, 
and Thomsen (2007) find that males with a migration background in West Germany have 
significantly lower earnings prospects than native Germans, over their entire life-cycle 
and independent of gender and skill. The findings referenced above constitute a mere 
fraction of the studies identifying this persistent unemployment gap.  
 
 Overall, immigrants in Germany face strong and persistent barriers at all phases 
of labor market integration. A very large body of literature has been devoted in Germany 
to addressing the causes of these barriers. For the purpose of establishing both the appeal 
of self-employment over wage employment, as well as the importance of start-up grants 
in helping the unemployed utilize self-employment, a brief survey of this literature is 
provided herein. The factors driving this unemployment gap are broken down into three 
categories: human capital explanations, demographic explanations, and market reasons.  
 
 Human Capital Explanations 
 Kogan (2004) and Boeri, Hanson, and McCormick (2002) conclude that the 
higher risk of unemployment among immigrants in Germany is clearly related to their 
inferior human capital compared to natives. Simple human capital theory suggests that as 
any laborer gains education, training, and/or labor market experience, they become more 
employable. Recent migrants face difficulties in many of these aspects of human capital 
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attainment. With regards to education, the classic problem for migrants is whether the 
benefits of education received in their home country will transfer to the destination 
country. The skills and lessons learned from such education are clearly still present in the 
individual migrant; however, when seeking paid employment, a potential employer faces 
imperfect information regarding the true quality of a migrant’s education if received 
abroad.  In line with this imperfect information explanation, Bauer, Dietz, Zimmermann 
and Zwintz (2005) find that the problem of transferring human capital for migrants is 
greatly diminished when the origin country of the migrant is very similar to the 
destination country in terms of language, culture, and the labor market. Aldashev, 
Gernandt and Thomsen (2007) concur, and demonstrate that migrants whose education is 
obtained abroad face lower earnings profiles than native Germans.  
 
 According to Constant and Larsen (2004), immigrants who have very few 
qualifications from their origin countries are more likely to seek out schooling once in 
Germany. Bauer, Dietz, Zimmermann and Zwintz (2005) argue that immigrants who 
invest in the country-specific human capital of the receiving country are indeed able to 
increase their productivity over time. Despite the possibility of increased wages through 
country-specific education, foreign children in Germany have shown high probabilities of 
only attaining the minimum level of education required by law (Haisken-DeNew et al, 
1997). Constant and Larsen (2004) point out that there exists a “strong link” between the 
education of fathers and children among immigrant families, painting a poor picture of 
immigrant education prospects in the German economy. 
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 Cramer (1984), and later Bender and Karr (1993) assess the impact of 
occupational training on observed differences in unemployment rates of foreign guest 
workers and natives. Cramer finds, and Bender and Karr then confirm for later data, that 
much of the immigrant-native unemployment gap can be explained by guest workers with 
comparably bad occupational training to natives. Similar to the intergenerational 
transmission of education, the participation rate of second-generation immigrants in 
vocational training is equally lacking, standing at about one-third the participation of 
German nationals (Zimmermann, Kahanec, Constant, DeVoretz, Gataullina, and Zaiceva, 
2008). With regards to language skills, these same authors cite that inefficient integration 
policies have failed to induce sufficient language acquisition for immigrants in Germany, 
which have led to deficient economic and societal integration (Zimmermann, Kahanec, 
Constant, DeVoretz, Gataullina, and Zaiceva, 2008). Frick and Wagner (2001) contend 
however, that although knowledge of German is a requisite condition for success in the 
regular employment sector, it alone is not sufficient to guarantee labor market success for 
immigrants.  
 
 Demographic Explanations 
 In addition to human capital accumulation, various demographic factors have 
been offered to explain the ability of migrants to integrate successfully into employment. 
Some of these explanations correlate with underlying human capital differences across 
demographics; however, many stand on their own. Age, for instance, has been identified 
as exhibiting a U-shaped relationship with the frequency of unemployment for native 
German workers and some migrants alike, meaning that jobs are most stable during an 
individual’s middle years. However, the frequency of unemployment is higher at the 
	   16	  
extremes of age for migrants compared to natives (Winkelmann and Zimmermann, 
1993). Furthermore, the older a migrant is upon arrival in Germany, the less likely that 
individual is to acquire the Germany-specific education that raises employment prospects 
(Constant and Larson, 2004). A popular variable in migration studies is years-since-
migration, and is frequently used to gauge an immigrant’s attachment to the destination 
country economically and socially. Boeri, Hanson, and McCormick (2002) found that the 
unemployment risks of migrants decline as time progresses from an immigrant’s arrival, 
but that this does not occur for guest-workers in Germany. It makes logical sense that 
guest-workers, who arrived between 1955 and 1973 with guaranteed employment, have 
faced higher risks of unemployment in the time since they gained residence but lost 
guest-worker status. 
 
 The literature finds that strong country-of-origin effects exist in the 
unemployment persistence of immigrants in Germany. Again, the differences between 
various arrival cohorts are often manifested in the differential human capital of the 
immigrants across cohorts. Turks notably underperform other nationalities in terms of 
educational attainment (Constant and Larson, 2004).  Cohorts from Turkey and similar 
guest-worker countries clearly underperform ethnic German migrants in terms of 
earnings and unemployment risks (Boeri, Hanson, and McCormick, 2002). It appears that 
Turks in Germany operate at a greater disadvantage than other guest-worker cohorts, and 
may in fact drive most findings of an immigrant-native employment gap (Uhlendorff and 
Zimmermann, 2006). Among ethnic German migrants, some disagreement exists 
regarding the relative success of various cohorts. Schmidt, Stilz, and Zimmermann (1994) 
and Bauer and Zimmermann (1995, 1997) find that Übersiedler have a higher probability 
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of finding employment within the first two years after immigration than Aussiedler. 
Seifert (1996) finds the opposite, that Aussiedler have lower employment prospects than 
the Übersiedler. Schmidt, Stilz, and Zimmermann (1994) also find that females need 
significantly more time than males to find employment, attributing this to the fact that 
most female immigrants were educated in occupations that are already in excess supply 
in Germany.  
 
 Market Explanations 
 Bauer and Zimmermann (1995, 1997) find that local unemployment conditions 
can explain the native-immigrant unemployment difference if immigrants are primarily 
settling in high-unemployment areas compared to natives. To the extent that specific 
vulnerable industries in Germany are located primarily in the high-unemployment regions 
of the country, this effect may instead be better addressed by examining immigrant 
representation in volatile industries. Kogan (2004) makes this case very clearly, as do 
Boeri, Hanson, and McCormick (2002), who state that a high concentration of migrants 
in sectors that are comparably instable (notably manufacturing) leads to greater 
unemployment risks for immigrants. Cramer (1984) and Bender and Karr (1993) both 
find that immigrant concentration in industries with high unemployment dampens their 
overall employment prospects relative to natives.  
 
 A popular factor studied in recent migration literature has been the effect of ethnic 
enclaves on immigrant labor market performance, although many of these studies suffer 
from endogeneity problems given evidence of out-migration of high-skilled foreigners 
from these enclaves. Constant and Larson (2004) find that second generation immigrants 
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born into ethnic enclaves in Germany are less likely to finish schooling, indicating lower 
preparation for labor market success. However, some researchers have found that 
enclaves actually increase employment prospects, perhaps because human capital is more 
transferable in an enclave of immigrants with similar education and migration histories. 
Seifert (1996) found that immigrants who did not use ethnic networks when looking for a 
job had a lower probability of finding employment compared to immigrants who did 
utilize networks. Åslund, Edin, and Fredriksson (2003) found that the size of the ethnic 
enclave in the United States had a positive impact on earnings for low-educated 
immigrant workers. Boeri, Hanson and McCormick (2002) also argue that natives’ 
personal fears regarding a loss of cultural homogeneity, especially given Germany’s 
reluctant history of immigration and perhaps due in part to the prevalence of such 
enclaves in Germany, may lead to discrimination in the labor market against immigrants 
via depressed wages and increased unemployment.  
 
 Overall, these various effects describe a complex interaction of human capital, 
exogenous factors, and basic demographic differences that may lead to the more frequent 
incidence of unemployment among immigrants relative to natives. No one factor 
necessarily reigns supreme; however, in the aggregate, foreigners in Germany appear to 
act at a disadvantage in finding jobs and spend more time overall in unemployment. This 
finding presents the underlying question of importance in this paper – if immigrants are 
more likely to be unemployed than natives, how can the welfare state help these 
disadvantaged laborers move back into the market and remain employed? 
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Immigrant Dependence on Welfare and Unemployment Benefits 
 An equally rich body of research has analyzed immigrants’ use of welfare benefits 
in Germany and elsewhere abroad, and a similarly brief survey of this literature will be 
conducted in hopes of understanding the problems faced by migrants in moving off of 
public support and back into employment. Although the reasons for dependence on 
welfare benefits may mimic in name the difficulties faced by migrants searching for a 
job, this section addresses a clearly distinct matter from the previous discussion. It was 
shown that immigrants more frequently enter unemployment compared to natives due to 
difficulties finding gainful jobs. Unemployment benefits in Germany, coupled with a 
strong complement of active labor market programs and benefit sanctions are meant to 
induce a return to work for the difficult-to-employ. In other words, unemployment 
benefits and accompanying active labor market programs offer the difficult-to-employ a 
chance for “catch-up”; an opportunity to compensate for the difficulties faced when 
finding employment through the use of short-term living allowances, training classes, 
job-search assistance, and other employment promotion programs. Despite this chance 
for “catch-up”, the literature on immigrant dependence on German unemployment 
benefits is relatively unanimous in its findings – beyond being more likely to enter 
unemployment, immigrants transition out of unemployment at lower rates than natives as 
well. 
 
 In the context of employment promotion, the failure of immigrants to leave 
behind welfare benefits and return to gainful employment must be analyzed to determine 
the specific factors that affect immigrants’ dependence on state support when 
unemployed. Later on in this paper, these factors will be used in conjunction with 
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variables that explain immigrant proclivity for self-employment to inform a discussion of 
how to best promote self-employment in the German welfare state. Prior to addressing 
immigrant dependence, this paper will establish a brief understanding of the various types 
of welfare and unemployment benefits available to laborers in Germany. 
 
 Summary of German Unemployment Insurance and Welfare Schemes    
Prior to 2005, individuals in the German labor market had access to three types of 
benefits: 
(1) Unemployment Insurance (Arbeitslosengeld) – These benefits were provided 
to the short-term unemployed and were funded through contributions by 
employed individuals across the country. UI benefits had a limited duration, 
and were based on the individual’s previous salary and earnings (up to 67% of 
previous income). 
(2) Unemployment Assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe) – These benefits were given to 
the longer-term unemployed, funded through taxes, means-tested, and offered 
an infinite duration. These benefits were also based on an individual’s 
previous salary, with a maximum replacement rate of 57% previous income. 
(3) Social Assistance (Sozialhilfe) – These welfare payments were given to 
individuals who had never been employed, and were means-tested, tax-
funded, and infinite in duration. 
 
 UI and UB (Arbieitslosenhilfe) recipients were eligible to participate in a set of 
active labor market programs intended to facilitate the rapid mobilization of these 
workers back into the labor market. These programs varied in range from training and 
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skill provision courses to public employment schemes, and were mildly successful at 
mobilizing individuals back into employment. Recipients of social assistance benefits 
were ineligible to participate in any labor market promotion programs, and were 
effectively permanently dependent on these benefits.   
 
 In 2003, in the wake of rising unemployment and a well-documented scandal 
concerning unscrupulous accounting practices by the Federal Employment Agency in 
drastically overstating its own success, SPD Chancellor Gerhard Schröder commissioned 
a team of business experts and academics to accomplish a systematic reevaluation of the 
German welfare and unemployment insurance system. This commission, known 
primarily by the name of its chairperson Peter Hartz, first proposed a series of drastic 
reforms to the German welfare system in 2003. These changes were drafted and adopted 
legislatively in bundles now known as Hartz I, Hartz II, and Hartz III, and accomplished 
revisions and additions of various active labor market programs, as well as a marked 
reorganization of placement services provided by the government, in hopes of 
engendering a more client-agent relationship between labor offices and the unemployed.  
 
 Arguably the signal accomplishment of the Hartz Commission was its fourth 
legislative package, Hartz Vier (Hartz IV). Adopted in 2005, Hartz IV restructured the 
entire German welfare state by nationalizing the distribution of unemployment benefits 
out of the hands of inefficient localities, and combining previous unemployment 
assistance (to the long-term unemployed) with former social assistance (to the never-
employed) to provide ALMP access to all those capable of work.  
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The present system now provides two main types of benefits: 
(1) Arbeitslosengeld I (ALGI) – Provided to the short-term unemployed just like 
former UI, but the maximum duration of eligibility is much shorter than 
former UI. Benefits are still based on the previous salary of the recipient. 
(2) Arbeitslosengeld II (ALGII) – Provided to both the long-term unemployed 
(transitioning off of ALGI), and the never-employed who are physically able 
to work beyond an arbitrary threshold of fifteen hours per week. This benefit 
is means-tested and issued at a flat-rate oriented to the legally defined social 
minimum of household incomes. Under the means-testing procedure, 
recipients are forced to liquidate assets until a job that provides sufficient 
income to move off of ALGII is acquired, or no assets remain. 
(3) A heavily modified form of social assistance does remain, but effectively 
serves as disability insurance for those who are physically unable to work 
fifteen hours per week (the minimum requirement of ALGII receipt).  
 
 Access to all of these benefits for foreigners depends upon the residence status 
and origin of immigrants in Germany. Table Two summarizes these regulations. EU 
residents and ethnic Germans are generally treated on comparable terms to natives in 
regards to access to welfare benefits and unemployment insurance. New immigrants from 
non-EU countries are still eligible for the full complement of benefits, but are not 
immediately eligible for short-term unemployment insurance (Arbeitslosengeld I, ALGI) 
until they have worked a job in Germany which pays into the social security system. 
Asylum seekers, governed under an alternative welfare system, very often possess limited 
human capital relative to other individuals in Germany, and are less likely to seek any 
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form of employment including self-employment (Constant and Zimmermann, 2005). As a 
result, they are more reliant on welfare benefits than other foreigners (Büchel et al., 
1996).  
 
TABLE TWO: POST-HARTZ ELIGIBILITY FOR ALGI/ALGII/SA 
Foreigner Cohort Level of Access Policy Source(s) 
Non-German EU 
Residents 
Complete The Principle of Equal Treatment 
(Article 51 of the EC Treaty) forbids 
differential access to public benefits 
between natives and foreigners. 
Boeri, Hanson 
and McCormick, 
2002 
Ethnic German 
Resettlers (Pre-
Reunification) 
Complete Ethnic Germans and East Germans 
who arrived in West Germany before 
unification are primarily treated as 
natives. 
Riphahn, 1998; 
Riphahn, 
Sander, and 
Wunder, 2010 
First generation immigrants can go 
straight into ALGII receipt. 
 
Non-German Non-EU 
Foreigners 
Partial 
If not permanent residents, 
immigrants can lose right to seek 
residence permit extensions or 
permanent residence for accessing 
benefits. 
Riphahn, 1998; 
Riphahn, 
Sander, and 
Wunder, 2010 
Asylum 
Seekers/Refugees 
Partial Funded under a separate system 
from social assistance and 
unemployment insurance. Benefits 
usually smaller than main welfare 
benefits. 
Riphahn, 1998; 
Riphahn, 
Sander, and 
Wunder, 2010 
 
 
 Descriptive Findings on Immigrant Use of Public Benefits 
 As shown previously, immigrants are drastically over-represented on the welfare 
and unemployment benefit rolls. The striking statistics offered in the introduction of this 
paper are worthy of mention once again – in 2006, immigrants comprised 34% of all 
welfare and unemployment benefit recipients, yet only 19.5% of the German population 
(Thomsen and Walter, 2010). In Germany specifically, the welfare dependency of 
immigrants has drastically increased over time compared to natives (Boeri, Hanson and 
McCormick, 2002). From 1985 to 1993, social security expenditures increased by more 
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than 106%, with three-fold increases in the number of foreign-born benefit recipients 
driving this effect (Bauer, Dietz, Zimmermann and Zwintz, 2005). Buhr and Weber 
(1996) contend that specifically, the immigration of ethnic Germans and refugees in the 
late 1980s is responsible for the increase in benefit recipients. Similar increases in social 
assistance receipt were seen in Sweden in the 1990s, driven by increases in immigrant 
use of the benefits (see Backman and Bergmark, 2004).  
 
 Riphahn (1998) offers historical statistics on Social Assistance (SA, sozialhilfe) 
benefit receipt, pointing out that in 1980, foreign residents comprised 8.3% of such 
welfare recipients at a reasonable 7.2% population share. Riphahn continues however, 
and notes that by 1993, foreigners made up 32.9% of all welfare recipients, and 10% of 
the population.  Bauer, Dietz, Zimmermann and Zwintz (2005) offer statistics regarding 
the percentage of each immigrant cohort receiving social security benefits in West 
Germany in 1995, and all immigrant groups (including pre-1984 guest-workers, post 
1984 guest-workers, Übersiedler, Aussiedler, and refugees) exceed natives in relative 
benefit receipt. 
 
 Many have contended that this disparity in welfare use is a product of an 
“immigrant fixed effect”, wherein the higher welfare dependence of immigrants is due to 
some immeasurable difference in the behavior or attitude of these migrants toward 
welfare receipt, rather than their depressed socioeconomic and human capital 
characteristics which dictate an increased need for state support. Thomsen and Walter 
(2010), as an example, find evidence of such a fixed effect in the very short term for one 
specific active labor market program in Germany. The next section of this review of the 
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literature examines the question – does such an immigrant fixed effect exist, or, when you 
control for observable characteristics, are immigrants residually dependent upon 
welfare/unemployment benefits over natives? 
 
 Are immigrants residually dependent upon public benefits when unemployed? 
 Boeri, Hanson and McCormick (2002) measure residual dependence as an 
immigrant’s actual dependence upon benefits subtracted by their predicted dependence 
on benefits based upon observable characteristics. These authors provide four theoretical 
mechanisms whereby residual dependence may develop. First, they cite previous studies 
that low-skill migrants choose destination countries based upon the generosity of that 
country’s welfare state (see e.g. Borjas, 1999). Additionally, the authors identify the 
psychological trauma of actual migration and potential language barriers as reasons why 
migrants may be naturally disadvantaged in finding employment. Discrimination is also 
discussed, in that employers may discriminate on the basis of ethnicity when hiring and 
compensating migrant workers, even within legal bounds. Lastly, the authors discuss the 
influence of network effects, whereby living with co-ethnics restricts immigrant 
assimilation independent of human capital abilities. Boeri, Hanson and McCormick, 
despite this succinct analysis of potential reasons for residual dependency, find no 
evidence of residual dependency of migrants on former Arbeitslosenhilfe (UB) benefits in 
Germany.  
 
 Other research into residual dependence in Germany has revealed similar results. 
Büchel et al. (1996) found that only Aussiedler and refugees exhibit any signs of positive 
residual dependency over natives. Castronova et al. (2001) found that once controls for 
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socio-demographic characteristics were included, immigrant households became no more 
likely to even take-up these benefits compared to natives. Riphahn (1998) and Riphahn 
(2004) actually found evidence that immigrants exhibited a negative residual dependency 
over natives, meaning that immigrants were less likely to take-up benefits at any given 
level of socioeconomic ability. 
 
 How do these findings mesh with the overwhelming statistics that immigrants 
receive benefits disproportionate to their size in the labor force? It is clear – if immigrants 
are no more likely than natives to be dependent upon welfare benefits at any given 
socioeconomic or human capital level, then these migrants are simply unable to find jobs 
which, based upon their inferior qualifications, provide enough earnings to match the 
reservation wage created by German unemployment benefits.  Based upon this premise, 
Boeri, Hanson and McCormick (2002) argue that immigrants are only more likely to 
remain on unemployment benefits and welfare assistance because they exhibit a reduced 
earnings capacity. Schneider and Uhlendorff (2004) confirm this assertion, and find that 
at a given level of social welfare payment, immigrants are more likely to exit from social 
assistance to employment as predicted market wage increases.  
 
 An analysis of the factors offered by the literature to explain immigrants’ 
increased reliance upon welfare benefits reveals that such explanations are very similar to 
the reasons for immigrants’ decreased employability in general. This suggests a clear 
phenomenon, that immigrants are not intrinsically more likely than natives to remain on 
welfare or unemployment benefits, but instead are unable to find jobs which facilitate an 
expedient and successful transition off of these benefits. Although the lack of an intrinsic 
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difference between native and foreign laborers may suggest that immigrants should not 
be treated as distinct from other low-skilled natives, it still remains true that the 
underlying causes of immigrants reduced welfare dependence are immigrant-specific 
(e.g. discrimination, lack of country-specific human capital, language barriers, enclave 
effects), and must be treated differently than causes of welfare dependence for natives.  
 
 Explanatory Factors for Immigrant Welfare Dependence 
 For human capital-related factors, Riphahn (1998) finds rather oddly that a higher 
level of education is correlated with higher welfare dependence for foreigners only, and 
not natives. Riphahn, Sander and Wunder (2010), in analyzing take-up rates, suggest that 
higher levels of education may be a means to more effectively overcome the hurdles and 
barriers to enforcing claims and receiving the maximum amount of benefits possible. 
These findings run counter to the traditional logic, that increased education should 
augment earnings prospects for laborers in the market. The suggestion that more 
education increased the recipient’s ability to enforce benefit claims makes logical sense; 
however, it does not fully explain why natives, who naturally have a better understanding 
of the German welfare state than immigrants, do not display similar returns to education. 
Schneider and Uhlendorff (2004) find that higher levels of education of the immigrant 
household head actually have little to no influence on the probability of exiting social 
welfare. This finding makes more logical sense, especially given the human capital 
transferability problems faced by foreign-educated immigrants. 
 
 Riphahn (1998) and (2004) find that the risk of welfare dependence is highest for 
single parent households rather than couples, and that this effect, although significant, is 
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dampened in immigrants when compared to natives. Schneider and Uhlendorff (2004) 
agree with this finding.  Couples with young children decrease welfare dependence for 
German couples and foreign couples alike, except that families with older children 
actually exhibit increased welfare dependence for immigrants. Likewise, the risk of 
welfare dependence is high in families with more than two generations residing in the 
household (Riphahn, 1998). The existence of a handicapped household head has little to 
no influence on the transition probability out of welfare dependence (Schneider and 
Uhlendorff, 2004).  These findings suggest that welfare and/or unemployment benefits 
may provide a much-needed secure source of income for families with large financial 
burdens, which is difficult to secure in the labor market. 
 
 Büchel et al. (1996) found that for all immigrant groups, the probability of 
receiving social security benefits decreases with the time of residency in Germany. Boeri, 
Hanson, and McCormick (2002) also find that welfare dependency declines with the 
duration of stay of migrant households, in both Germany and Sweden.  These authors 
point out that non-humanitarian migrants in Germany assimilate more rapidly out of 
welfare than other migrants. These findings are consistent with general labor-market 
assimilation models, which predict that the longer a migrant lives and works in the 
destination country’s economy, the more successful that individual will be.  
 
 These factors, combined with the previous findings on immigrant residual welfare 
dependence demonstrate that immigrants’ over-dependence on public benefits is driven 
not by any intrinsic fixed effect, but rather the same factors which drive their decreased 
employability relative to natives. 
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 Section Three has therefore established two clear facts which will underlie the 
remaining portions of this analysis. First, immigrants face significant difficulties in the 
labor market when seeking employment compared to natives; and second, these labor 
market difficulties, based upon human capital and market characteristics, are likely 
driving previous findings that immigrants in Germany are more likely to remain on 
welfare and unemployment benefits than natives.  Section Four will address the various 
methods with which the German welfare state can counteract this problem and work 
towards employment parity between immigrants and natives. 
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SECTION FOUR: IMMIGRANTS AND THE SELF-EMPLOYMENT DECISION 
 
 Immigrant labor market deficiencies, as manifested in a higher incidence of 
unemployment and welfare dependence, pose a problem for the German welfare state in 
finding creative ways to decrease welfare expenditures on migrants, effectively mobilize 
these workers, and ensure that migrant residence in Germany is economically beneficial 
rather than harmful.   
 
 The German welfare state has long taken to identifying disadvantaged groups 
within the labor market for special integration efforts.  The Hartz Reforms, for instance, 
identified women, youth, and the long-term unemployed as those in special need of 
activation measures (Mosley, 2008). Despite all of the previous analyses which cite 
immigrants’ over-dependence on welfare benefits and diminished employment prospects 
compared to natives, the German welfare state has failed to specifically tailor its primary 
activation programs to the needs of immigrants in hopes of mobilizing the hard-to-
employ.   
 
 This paper examines the ability of self-employment to overcome immigrants’ 
poor prospects in the German labor market. Klaus Zimmermann, Director of the Institute 
for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn, Germany, identifies self-employment as a 
beneficial and promising means of immigrant integration and assimilation in Germany, 
and a means to overcome labor market deficiencies of foreigners which stem not from 
behavior, but from a lack of human capital (Zimmermann, 2005). Constant and Schultz-
Nielsen (2004) argue that immigrants face great opportunities to gain from self-
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employment because of the “human capital paradigm” which poses problems in paid 
employment. 
 
 Constant and Shachmurove (2003) argue that immigrants are clear candidates for 
entrepreneurial success, by virtue of their willingness to accept the inherent struggles of 
migration both financially and mentally. Constant, Shachmurove and Zimmermann 
(2005) claim that immigrants are more likely to be risk-loving, high-ability, quick 
decision-makers, and therefore constitute a self-selected group of individuals willing to 
take risks to maximize their own personal welfare through self-employment.  
 
 Worldwide, the burgeoning literature on immigrant self-employment presents 
entrepreneurialism as a means through which an immigrant can circumvent the traditional 
problems faced by non-natives in the labor market, including, for instance, the low 
transferability of human capital from an immigrant’s home country. The most promising 
evidence presented by researchers studying immigrant entrepreneurialism concerns the 
ability of self-employment to help foreigners reach earnings parity with natives. If this is 
the case, incentivized self-employment may provide a targeted means of activation for 
unemployed migrants in Germany with great potential for success. 
 
Earnings Parity from Self-Employment: International and German Evidence 
 This self-employment earnings phenomenon has been identified both in Germany 
and internationally. In the United States, several researchers have identified a catch-up 
effect, allowing self-employment to help migrants approach the earnings level of natives. 
Lofstrom (2002) found that self-employed immigrants in the US earned on average 4.6% 
more than self-employed natives in 1980, usually reaching similar levels of earnings to 
	   32	  
self-employed natives at age thirty. Lofstrom predicts the earnings of self-employed 
immigrants if they had instead chosen the wage/salary sector, and finds that such 
entrepreneurs would face stronger difficulties in achieving earnings parity with self-
employed natives if they were instead employed in a wage or salaried job.   
 
 Lofstrom also finds that wage/salary immigrants never reach earnings parity with 
natives, but that self-employed immigrants catch up with wage/salary natives’ earnings 
and eventually with self-employed natives’ earnings as well. George Borjas’s seminal 
1986 study of the self-employment experience of immigrants in the US notes that self-
employed migrants have higher annual incomes than migrant salaried workers, as well as 
higher incomes than comparable self-employed natives.  In Germany, Constant (1998) 
found that self-employed immigrants reach earnings parity with self-employed natives, 
and exhibit an income premium over blue-collar wage migrants. Constant, Shachmurove 
and Zimmermann (2003, 2005) find that the earnings of self-employed immigrants 
converge quickly to the earnings of self-employed natives, irrespective of differences in 
country-of-origin and entrepreneurial tradition.  
 
 The evidence on this matter is clear – immigrants appear able to overcome 
socioeconomic and human capital deficiencies through self-employment earnings by 
reaching earnings parity with comparable self-employed (and at times, wage-employed) 
natives. Constant, Shachmurove and Zimmermann (2003) specifically note that, in light 
of these earnings parity findings, “it is unclear why in a country with relatively high 
unemployment rate and with a relatively institutionalized labor market entry one does not 
observe more self-employment among immigrants.”  To the extent that self-employment 
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promotion can be used to successfully mobilize unemployed immigrants, this mismatch 
between the earnings prospects of self-employed foreigners and any decreased use of 
self-employment by immigrants can be minimized. 
 
Legal Status of Immigrant Self-Employment in Germany 
 Before assessing the various human capital and demographic factors which lead 
immigrants into self-employment both in Germany and abroad, attention should be 
devoted to the legal status of immigrants who seek to be self-employed in Germany. Is 
self-employment a feasible and legal option for non-citizens to pursue in Germany? 
 
 Although immigrants from within the European Union have labor market rights 
equal to those of native Germans, foreigners from non-EU countries are still subject to 
the Foreigners Law of 1965, which explicitly prohibits immigrants from engaging in 
entrepreneurial activities and restricts foreigners’ right to freely choose occupation and 
place of work. Only foreigners in possession of an unlimited residence permit after 
several years in Germany are permitted to found a business. Immigrants without such a 
permit are encouraged to apply for special permission to found a business, and in 
practice, these applications have become more a formality than an actual limitation on 
self-employment (Constant and Shachmurove, 2003).  
 
 The 2005 Immigration Act contains special provisions for attracting self-
employed persons to Germany, permitting entrepreneurs to obtain a residence permit if 
their start-up activity is expected to have a positive impact on the economy in terms of 
created jobs, and if the requisite start-up capital is feasibly available to the entrepreneur 
(Bundesministerium des Innern, 2005). For foreign entrepreneurs who do not meet these 
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conditions, each application is reviewed to determine whether there is an “overriding 
economic or specific regional interest”, and to assess the financial solvency of the 
proposed start-up (Auswärtiges Amt, 2005).  
 
 For some professions within Germany, self-employment is more difficult than for 
similar professions in other countries. For instance, doctors and lawyers, as well as 
several crafts-oriented traditional entrepreneurial ventures require advanced certificates in 
Germany in order to legally operate (Caliendo and Künn, 2010). It is likely that such 
advanced certificates would be harder for immigrants over natives to attain. Furthermore, 
the German regulatory system prevents entrepreneurs from starting a second company if 
their first business files for bankruptcy (Caliendo and Künn, 2010). For immigrants 
choosing self-employment as a means of circumventing difficulties in finding paid 
employment due to low skills or education, these may be problematic; however, they 
provide an even stronger case for public support of entrepreneurialism given difficulties 
that autonomous immigrants may face without experienced advice from the local welfare 
office. 
 
 For those immigrants who do choose to pursue self-employment, the next section 
will address the determinants of entrepreneurial success for immigrant laborers. The role 
of various human capital and demographic factors will be assessed, as well as the 
importance of non-individual market variables like ethnic enclaves and local 
unemployment rates.  
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The Success of Self-Employment for Immigrants 
 This section will address which factors predict both the decision to become self-
employed, and the ultimate success of self-employed migrants. Note that the literature 
discussed below refers primarily to the decisions of all migrants, unemployed and 
employed, to enter self-employment. Later in this section, any possible differences 
between an employed migrants’ decision to choose self-employment and the same 
decision for unemployed migrants will be discussed, and upon examination found to be 
minimal in nature. 
 
 Human Capital Factors 
 The impact of human capital factors on the propensity to be self-employed and 
the success of entrepreneurial ventures for immigrants (both unemployed and employed) 
has been studied in several countries. In the United States, Lofstrom (1999) found that 
self-employment among immigrants is correlated with lower high school drop out rates 
and higher college graduation rates than with wage/salaried migrant workers. This 
finding is perhaps a result of the types of industries in which migrants in the United 
States are primarily employed, specifically in low-skill hard labor jobs like agriculture. 
Borjas (1986) found a similar distinction thirteen years prior to Lofstrom, that education 
has a positive and significant impact on US immigrant self-employment rates.  Lofstrom 
(1999, 2002) also finds that returns to education in the United States, measured in 
earnings, are greater for self-employed immigrants over comparable wage/salary 
workers. Kahanec and Mendola (2007) contend that, unlike the United States, secondary 
education and possession of a higher university degree in the United Kingdom actually 
increase the chance of migrants working in paid employment. Clark and Drinkwater 
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(2000) find variable returns to education on labor success for self-employed migrants in 
the United Kingdom across different ethnic groups.  
 
 For Germany, Constant, Shachmurove and Zimmermann (2005) find that 
education is not a significant determinant of the probability to become self-employed for 
migrants, nor does it exert a significant positive effect on the earnings of self-employed 
migrants. In fact, higher educated immigrant entrepreneurs who were schooled in 
Germany actually face an earnings penalty of six percent, while education in the origin 
country has inconsequential effects.  The authors explain this finding in that immigrants 
will only build more education in Germany as a means of entering paid-employment, 
where in-country education is a key signal of labor market abilities to native employers 
(Constant, Shachmurove and Zimmermann, 2005). With regards to vocational training 
participation, Constant and Zimmermann (2005) and Constant and Schultz-Nielsen 
(2004) similarly find marginal and inconsequential returns to participation for immigrant 
entrepreneurs.  
 
 Kahanec and Mendola (2007) find that club membership or voluntary work in an 
organization within the United Kingdom, as a measure of social and cultural assimilation, 
is positively related to the probability of choosing paid employment over self-
employment. This suggests that migrants with greater cultural capital are more willing 
and able to gain paid employment, and thus less likely to need self-employment as an 
alternative. Similarly, Caliendo and Künn (2010) argue that those with greater previous 
labor force assimilation in Germany have a high probability of finding wage 
employment.  
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 Regarding language skills as an indicator of human capital, Lofstrom (1999) finds 
that immigrants in the United States face a higher penalty for limited English ability in 
the self-employment sector. This finding may lack transferability to Germany, where 
ethnic enclaves are more frequent and the self-employed can operate independent of 
native language and cultures. Additionally, the concentration of wage-employed migrants 
in the United States in hard-labor industries (notably agriculture) clarifies that language 
skills in the United States are potentially less important.   
 
 Demographic Factors 
 Borooah and Hart (1999) identify social attributes regarding family formation as 
significantly important in determining the self-employment propensities of Indians and 
black Caribbean men in Great Britain. Kahanec and Mendola (2007) argue similarly that 
the number of household members is positively associated with the likelihood of being 
self-employed in the United Kingdom, as are stronger family ties rooted in Britain. 
Constant and Shachmurove (2003) concur with regards to Germany, and argue that 
strong family bonds in Germany are usually the means through which immigrants gather 
the necessary assets to start new businesses. 
 
 Hout and Rosen (2000) offer that, in the United States, the tradition of self-
employment within a migrant’s family (specifically the father) is positive and significant 
in predicting self-employment for migrants. Constant and Zimmermann (2005) agree in 
the German context. Constant and Schultz-Nielsen (2004) offer descriptive evidence for 
Germany of the importance of family self-employment tradition, in that 42% of self-
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employed workers in their data sample reported that their parents were self-employed, 
while only 22% of salaried workers reported similarly. 
 
 Marriage, especially for migrants, has been shown to exert a positive influence on 
the likelihood to become self-employed. In general, married immigrant men in the United 
States exhibit higher self-employment rates than paid employment rates (Borjas, 1986), 
and the same is true for the United Kingdom (Kahanec and Mendola, 2007).  For 
Germany, Constant and Zimmermann (2005) confirm these international findings. 
However, according to Constant, Shachmurove and Zimmermann (2005), the earnings of 
self-employed immigrants decrease by 53% when the laborer is married. The authors 
identify three possible reconciliatory theories to explain both a higher incidence of 
married self-employment and a simultaneous drop in earnings in self-employment due to 
marriage – (1) immigrant wives help out with the family business and thus divide an 
ordinarily one-person income in half, (2) immigrant wives who make wages beyond 
those of their husbands lead males to exert less effort in self-employment, and/or (3) risk-
averse married male migrants are quickly thrust into self-employment when their 
qualifications are insufficient for paid employment, and are less successful than other 
entrepreneurs. Constant and Schultz-Nielsen (2004) find that men are twice as likely to 
be self-employed in Germany. 
 
 Disabled migrants in the United States are more likely than otherwise to be self-
employed in the United States (Borjas, 1986). Kahanec and Mendola (2007) find that 
better health indicates a higher probability of engaging in paid employment in the United 
Kingdom, although this effect is not statistically significant. For Germany, Constant and 
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Schultz-Nielsen (2004) find that the overwhelming majority of immigrant entrepreneurs 
are males in good health.  
 
 Clark and Drinkwater (2006) contend that some aspects of migrant culture, 
notably religion, can enhance entrepreneurial ambitions. Kahanec and Mendola (2007) 
disagree, and find that religiosity does not have an effect on self-employment or paid 
employment probabilities. For Germany, Constant and Zimmermann (2005) find likewise 
that religiosity (measured through church attendance) does not have an effect on either 
the propensity to become self-employed or paid-employed. 
 
 Lofstrom (1999) finds that in the United States, age is positively related to the 
probability of self-employment for migrants. Kahanec and Mendola (2007) find similar 
effects between paid and self-employment for age in the United Kingdom. Constant, 
Shachmurove, and Zimmermann (2005) uncover a stable age profile in Germany that is 
roughly comparable between Germans and immigrants. For both natives and foreigners, 
the probability of becoming self-employed increases significantly with age, at a 
decreasing rate. Likewise, earnings increase with age at a decreasing rate for self-
employed migrants and self-employed natives (Constant and Schultz-Nielsen, 2004). 
 
 Migration-Related Factors 
 Several factors measuring the migration history of individuals actually correspond 
with marked differences in the self-employment success and probability of laborers. 
Although highly correlated with age, years-since-migration is used frequently to proxy 
the degree of a migrant’s assimilation into the destination country’s labor market. Borjas 
(1986) finds that the probability of self-employment does not increase monotonically 
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with YSM in the United States, although the two variables do exhibit a positive 
relationship according to Lofstrom (1999). Borjas finds that most of the gap between 
foreign-born and native self-employment propensities develops between five and ten 
years post-migration.  
 
 Constant, Shachmurove and Zimmermann (2003, 2005) and Constant and 
Shachmurove (2003) assert that YSM has a U-shaped distribution with regards to the 
probability of self-employment for immigrants. Initially post-migration, migrants choose 
self-employment at high levels, but at a decreasing rate through later years since arrival 
until old age. These findings suggest, as referenced by Constant and Shachmurove 
(2002), that migrants use self-employment as a means of overcoming structural barriers 
and liquidity problems early after migration.  
 
 Constant and Zimmermann (2005) find that legal status upon entry into Germany 
is important in determining the self-employment probability of immigrants. Former 
refugees and asylum seekers are less likely to self-employ or work at all than other 
migrant cohorts. Self-employed migrants in Germany gained their residence permits 
more often due to gainful employment (rather than humanitarian or family reunification 
reasons) when compared to salaried migrants (Constant and Schultz-Nielsen, 2004). 
Former guest-workers, most notably the Turks (Arastirmalar and Vafki, 2003), are 
doubly-likely to become self-employed compared to other immigrants (Constant and 
Shachmurove, 2002, 2003).  
 
 With regards to national origin, Lofstrom (1999) identifies strong differences in 
human capital attainment and language proficiency across national origin cohorts in the 
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United States. Lofstrom notes that utilizing a simple dummy variable for “immigrants” in 
a regression on self-employment probabilities will greatly understate the proclivity of 
certain migrant groups within the migrant classification to engage in self-employment. 
Kahanec and Mendola (2007) find similar country-of-origin differences for migrants in 
the United Kingdom. Yuengert (1995) agrees, and argues that immigrants from origin 
countries with larger self-employment sectors will lead to higher rates of self-
employment in the United States. Hammarstedt (2001) finds similar effects in Sweden 
(Blume, Ejrnaes, Nielsen, and Würtz, 2009).  
  
 The evidence for country-of-origin effects in Germany is equally strong. Constant 
and Schulz-Nielsen (2004) identify strong discrepancies in human capital and labor 
market performances across five nationalities of migrants in Germany. For instance, 
Aussiedler from former German territories in Eastern Europe exhibit a lower probability 
of self-employment than natives (Schmidt, 1994). Consistently, the Turks are 
overwhelmingly more likely than natives and other migrant groups to be self-employed 
(Zimmermann, Kahanec, Constant, DeVoretz, Gataullina and Zaiceva, 2008), and receive 
statistically significantly higher earnings than other non-EU immigrants in self-
employment. (Constant and Shachmurove, 2003, 2005). Constant and Zimmermann 
(2005) identify Iranians as more likely to be in full-time employment than the Turks, Ex-
Yugoslavs and Poles residing in Germany.  
 
 Market Factors 
 For migrants in America, impediments to finding successful and gainful 
employment include discrimination in the labor market, and self-employment may 
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provide a precious avenue for upward mobility not found elsewhere in the labor market 
(Light, 1972). Meyer (1990), in a separate analysis of unemployment duration and 
benefits, identifies the fact that specific groups which face discrimination in the market 
are more likely to become self-employed due to depressed expected wages in paid 
employment. Clark and Drinkwater (1998) attribute large differences in the self-
employment probability of migrants against natives in Great Britain to discrimination in 
paid-employment.  Blume, Ejrnæs, Nielsen, and Würtz (2009) find similar discriminatory 
barriers in paid-employment for migrants in Denmark, in that differences in human 
capital among various migrant groups cannot explain transitional patterns into self and 
wage employment. For Germany, Caliendo and Künn (2010) offer self-employment as an 
alternative for migrants who feel discriminated against in dependent employment. 
Constant and Zimmermann (2005) use a composite variable of discrimination indicators 
present in a migrant’s labor market history and find that previous discrimination is a 
strong explanatory factor in the decision for immigrants to choose self-employment over 
dependent employment.  
  
 Unfavorable local unemployment conditions in Denmark induce higher rates of 
self-employment for immigrants, but not for natives (Jensen, Ejrnæs, Nielsen and Würtz, 
2003). Evidence exists that local unemployment rates actually correspond with decreased 
self-employment propensities for migrants in the United Kingdom (Kahanec and 
Mendola, 2007). In Germany, the evidence is equally mixed (Constant and Zimmermann, 
2005). Traditional economic logic argues that on one hand, immigrants in high-
unemployment localities may need self-employment to compensate for the lack of 
available wage jobs. However, immigrants in low-unemployment localities do have 
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access to greater demand for the goods or services provided by their entrepreneurial 
ventures, which could induce higher rates of self-employment. 
 
 Another primary concern in the literature on market-related reasons for self-
employment proclivity is the analysis of network effects and ethnic enclaves. do Couto 
Sousa (2010) offers three ways in which an enclave can have an effect on the self-
employment decision-making of those within an enclave: 
 (1)  An ethnic enclave can induce higher prices through demand for goods not  
  regularly supplied in the non-enclave market.  
 (2) An ethnic enclave may lower self-employment costs by providing clear  
  information on market behavior of those within the enclave, few language  
  barriers, and increased access to credit. (Bowles and Colton, 2007). Borjas 
  and Bronars (1989) conclude that individuals in the United States might  
  actually prefer to do business with co-ethnics rather than natives. 
 (3) Enclaves may provide residents with stable high or low wage   
  opportunities in regular employment, affecting the reservation wage of  
  self-employment. 
 
 In the United States, Borjas (1986) and Lofstrom (1999) each found that the 
enclave effect increased the self-employment rate of ethnic migrants. However, Aldrich 
and Waldinger (1990) and Yuengert (1995) find little to no enclave effects on self-
employment rates. do Couto Sousa’s (2010) own analysis finds that immigrants with 
limited English skills are more likely to become self-employed as the English-speaking 
rate of the ethnic enclave increases. This suggests that a higher degree of separation 
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between the enclave and the regular economy helps laborers with the lowest 
employability select self-employment to make up the difference. 
 
 In Denmark, a higher concentration of immigrants in an area exerts a negative 
effect on transition probabilities out of unemployment, wage employment, or self-
employment. In other words, ethnic enclaves maintain the status quo labor situation of 
residents (Jensen, Ejrnæs, Nielsen and Würtz, 2009). Bager and Rezaei (2001) disagree, 
and find minimal effects of ethnic enclaves. For the United Kingdom, Clark and 
Drinkwater (2000, 2002) and Kahanec and Mendola (2007) identify a lower incidence of 
self-employment in areas with a higher ethnic concentration. For Sweden however, 
Åslund, Edin, and Fredriksson (2003) identified a strong positive earnings effect for self-
employment that occurred within an ethnic enclave. The international results on enclaves 
are distinctively inconclusive on the importance of ethnic homogeneity and separation of 
a community from the traditional labor market on the self-employment proclivity of 
immigrants. 
 
 Constant and Schultz-Nielsen (2004) find that in Germany, immigrants who live 
in enclaves exhibit a negative proclivity to self-employment, face an earnings penalty for 
self-employment, and that the majority of self-employed immigrants live outside of 
enclaves and are more spatially integrated. Despite this finding, Constant and 
Zimmermann (2005) argue contrarily, and state that living in ethnic enclaves reduces the 
chances to take-up full-time work and increases the chances of taking-up self-
employment. 
--------------- 
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 These various factors -- human capital, demographic, migration, and market -- are 
identified as strong determinants of the propensity for immigrants to become self-
employed by the literature. Any analysis of active labor market programs which promote 
self-employment must address the differential impact of these factors on the probability 
of successful integration of the unemployed back into gainful employment. Furthermore, 
any such program which seeks to target migrants and incentivize business start-up must 
be tailored to address the specific needs of various immigrant groups based upon these 
factors.  
 
Does the migrant decision to choose self-employment differ out of unemployment? 
 The literature discussed above treats both unemployed and employed migrants in 
the same pool, and therefore addresses the “state-of-nature” decision of migrants to 
choose self-employment over wage employment. In pooling both unemployed and 
employed migrants together, the previous analysis overstates the influence of migrants 
who choose self-employment out of wage-employment when applying these results to 
migrants rising out of unemployment. The decision to become self-employed out of 
unemployment could feasibly differ from the decision to choose self-employment from 
previous employment, in which case the preceding discussion is less relevant to start-up 
promotion programs for unemployed individuals. This possibility is very unlikely, 
however, based upon a careful reading of the literature. 
 
 Most notably, the previous analysis of the reasons for the popularity of self-
employment amongst immigrants identifies self-employment as a means of overcoming 
obstacles in the labor market to achieving successful wage employment. Therefore, these 
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transitions out of wage employment are necessarily predicated upon the same labor 
market deficiencies faced by the unemployed who struggle to find wage-labor jobs. 
Unemployed migrants, in this sense, are merely suffering from the worst of the 
consequences that drive their wage-employed peers into self-employment. If anything, 
unemployed migrants should be more likely to accept an entrepreneurial opportunity as a 
means of labor market integration than already-employed individuals, because of their 
already-depressed state. Low-skill migrants who are ill-prepared for the demands of self-
employment may be hesitant to engage in entrepreneurial activity unless incentivized to 
do so, whether unemployed or in menial wage jobs. 
 
 In fact, the literature confirms that the decision to become self-employed out of 
unemployment is very similar to the decision made out of previous employment. Pfeiffer 
and Reize (2000a), for instance, argue that an unemployed individual weighs the present 
value of the “stream of expected utilities” from remaining unemployed, from becoming a 
dependent employee (taking into account search costs), and from seeking self-
employment (taking into account the possibility of firm failure). This decision calculus, 
between the three available alternatives in the labor market, is constant irrespective of a 
laborer’s present market position. Schanne and Weyh (2009) demonstrate that the 
incentive to exit unemployment via higher wages in self-employment over wage 
employment is the predominant push factor for migrants off of unemployment benefits. 
Likewise, the literature expects wage-employed laborers to choose self-employment if 
corresponding earnings would increase as a result. Caliendo and Künn (2010) find that 
disadvantaged groups within the labor market use self-employment as a means of 
escaping unemployment due to human capital deficiencies. Reize (2000) pointedly 
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declares that the age profile for unemployed migrants transitioning into self-employment 
is similar to the age profile exhibited by wage-employed individuals who become self-
employed. 
 
 As a result, the literature offers little reason to discourage the application of 
previous studies on immigrants’ self-employment decisions out of wage employment (or 
studies where no distinction is made) when studying self-employment out of 
unemployment.  
--------------- 
 In all, Sections Three and Four have established several clear principles regarding 
immigrants in the German labor market which guide this study. First, immigrants are 
strongly disadvantaged in the labor market for a host of human capital, demographic, and 
market reasons. Second, these disadvantages can be seen in both an increasing gap in the 
wage and earnings of migrants compared to natives, as well as an increasing dependence 
on welfare and unemployment benefits. Third, self-employment offers immigrants an 
opportunity to reach earnings parity with natives, and overcome the labor market 
disadvantages previously described. 
 
 The remaining portions of this paper discuss the vitality of public self-
employment promotion in Germany as a means of moving immigrants off of 
unemployment benefits and back into the labor market.  
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SECTION FIVE: GERMAN PUBLIC SELF-EMPLOYMENT PROMOTION 
 This section will discuss the rationale behind self-employment promotion as a 
tool of labor market activation, as well as the international evidence regarding the success 
of self-employment promotion in mobilizing immigrants into employment, and the 
various programs offered by the German Federal Employment Agency that aim to 
incentivize and support start-up activity out of unemployment. 
 
A Generic Rationale for Self-Employment Promotion 
 Caliendo and Künn (2010) describe the rationale behind public self-employment 
promotion as a “double dividend” program, whereby: 
(1) Each subsidized unemployed individual receives support to enter the labor 
market, and thus builds human capital and experience during the period of 
self-employment which will help the individual remain an additive 
member of the economy, and hopefully avoid utilization of welfare 
benefits in the future. 
(2) From a macroeconomic perspective, more start-ups leads to increased 
competition, as well as more jobs created by newly-minted firms. 
 
 Additionally, several studies describe a multiplier effect of start-up activity within 
local markets. Wagner (2002) identifies a ‘regional entrepreneurial milieu’ as a positive 
pull-factor for the unemployed into self-employment. Wagner argues that higher levels of 
current start-up activity by the unemployed within a certain region will induce further 
start-up and entrepreneurial activity that benefits the economy. Schanne and Weyh (2009) 
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progress one step further, and state that the higher the probability of start-up success in a 
certain region, the more frequent future start-ups will occur.   
 
 Overall, start-up promotion aims to provide laborers with experience at work 
which can be translated into gainful employment through sustained entrepreneurial 
activities or transition to wage employment. This gainful employment reduces the 
caseload of the welfare state and augments the overall economic activity of an area. 
Indeed, Caliendo and Uhlendorff (2008) conclude by stating that self-employment is a 
“promising way to end individual non-employment”. 
 
An Immigrant Specific Rationale for Self-Employment Promotion 
 For immigrants specifically, start-up grants offer an opportunity to take advantage 
of the possibilities that self-employment provides to reach labor market parity with 
natives. Caliendo and Künn (2010) state explicitly that in the aggregate, the net effect of 
start-up grant receipt out of unemployment, compared to non-participation, is highest for 
disadvantaged individuals in the labor market. Martin and Grubb (2001) conduct a 
qualitative analysis of the literature on start-up grants at the time, and propose using self-
employment promotion to single out the unemployed who have natural entrepreneurial 
tendencies, which have been attributed to the risk-conscious activities of migrants in the 
past.  
 
 Furthermore, start-up grants and advice through a local welfare office allow 
immigrants to overcome the asymmetric information problems they would otherwise face 
when entering self-employment of their own accord. Constant and Shachmurove (2003) 
argue that Germany’s complicated corporate regulatory scheme, frequently criticized as 
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inhibitive and overly-bureaucratic, poses a special problem for immigrants who are 
relatively inexperienced with the system compared to natives.  
 
 Immigrants also operate at a disadvantage in accumulating the necessary 
investment capital to start a business. Research on entrepreneurism in Western Europe 
consistently finds that liquidity constraints are pressing and difficult to overcome for all 
entrepreneurs, but especially migrants (Lindh and Olsson, 1996; Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 1998; Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Taylor, 2001). Migrants must rely primarily 
on their families, friends, and ethnic networks for start-up loans and capital because they 
lack sufficient credit history to gain to access the usual funds available to natives through 
credit institutes, banks, and venture capitalists (Constant and Shachmurove, 2003). The 
lack of availability of sufficient funds for potential entrepreneurs has driven public self-
employment support to become a popular facet of many European welfare states. (Jensen, 
Ejrnæs, Nielsen, and Würtz, 2003).  
 
 With regards to Germany specifically, the level of entrepreneurial activity is 
consistently cited as low relative to other European countries (Constant and Schultz-
Nielsen, 2004). Despite this claim, the number of self-employed has risen consistently in 
Germany in recent years, reaching four million total in 2005 for the first time. The 
percentage of self-employed foreigners has also steadily risen since the mid-1970s when 
only 40,000 immigrants were registered as self-employed. As of 2001, over 250,000 
immigrants (8.4% of the foreign workforce) were registered as self-employed (Constant 
and Schultz-Nielsen, 2004). 
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 Constant, Shachmurove and Zimmermann (2005) find that migrants in Germany 
do in fact use self-employment more frequently than natives as a means of escaping 
unemployment, and potentially even as a first step towards later wage-employment. 
Jensen, Ejrnæs, Nielsen, and Würtz (2009) find that unemployed migrants in Denmark 
similarly favor self-employment over wage-employment when transitioning out of 
unemployment, especially when compared to natives.  
 
 Self-employment promotion for immigrants is therefore presented as a means of 
overcoming both (1) the difficulties that immigrants face in exiting unemployment into 
gainful employment of any variety, as well as (2) the difficulties that immigrants face in 
building sufficient capital and managerial know-how to start their own businesses 
without public support. To the extent that immigrants can reach earnings parity with 
comparable natives via self-employment, and to the extent that immigrants already favor 
transitioning to self-employment out of unemployment, these programs exhibit strong 
potential to benefit the labor market prospects of immigrants in Germany. 
 
International Evidence on Public Self-Employment Promotion 
 Prior to discussing the specific details and effectiveness of Germany’s start-up 
grant programs, the relatively narrow literature on similar promotion abroad is gathered 
to assess the extent to which similar programs can be effective in arenas outside the 
German labor market. Caliendo and Künn (2010) were useful in identifying many of 
these studies. It is of importance to note the dearth of discussion in the following 
international literature on the role that self-employment promotion can play for 
immigrant laborers. 
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 United States 
 Benus and Michaelides (2010) and Michaelides (2010) analyze a self-
employment training program offered in three American states known as “Project 
GATE”. Supported through the US Department of Labor from 2002-2005, this 
experimental program involved random assignment into treatment or control groups.   
 
 The experimental groups in these studies received significant self-employment 
counseling and training on seeking out financial support. The program had a substantial 
positive effect on the probability that recipients enter self-employment and remain 
employed (either self-employed or in later wage-employment) through five years after 
participation. Participation had a very small impact on the success of start-ups for the 
non-white / non-black participants in the program due to diminished access to start-up 
financing.  
 
 Additionally, Meager (1996) conducted a cross-national analysis of start-up aid to 
the unemployed, and concluded that in the case of the United States, Denmark, France, 
West Germany, and the United Kingdom, the evidence available was insufficient to 
assess the overall effectiveness of such schemes. 
 
 United Kingdom 
 Meager, Bates, and Cowling (2003) evaluated business start-up grants provided to 
eighteen-year-old to thirty-year-old laborers in the United Kingdom through the Prince’s 
Trust Foundation, which focused on mobilizing the unemployed and under-skilled. The 
authors found that participation in the program failed to induce any significant effects on 
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subsequent employment or earnings. Additionally, this period of self-employment failed 
to provide any later advantages in gaining paid-employment. 
 
 Australia 
 Kelly, Lewis, Mulvey and Dalzell (2002) analyzed a fifty-two week self-
employment allowance and training/counseling program offered to Australian workers. 
These researchers found a 56.2% survival rate in self-employment at three years post-
start-up.  
 
 New Zealand 
 Perry (2006) examined enterprise allowance grants in New Zealand between 1993 
and 1995, which provided business skills training and financial benefits to recipients. 
Using a difference-in-differences propensity score matching framework, Perry found 
significant benefits for participants in exiting unemployment quickly due to the grant.  
 
 Spain 
 Cueto and Mato (2006) analyze the success of start-up grants in Asturias, Spain 
from 1996-2000. Using a Cox proportional hazards model to estimate the survival rates 
of subsidized businesses, Cueto and Mato look at the determinants of self-employment 
survival and break down a “failure” between those who exit the initial start-up due to 
bankruptcy or different employment. The authors find that at two years, the survival rate 
of subsidized businesses is around 93%, and at five years is 76%.  Of those exiting self-
employment, only 47.5% did so due to bankruptcy while 52.5% did so voluntarily, 
indicating that start-up “exit” itself is an imperfect measure of the success of start-up 
programs.  This finding is important to future studies of start-up grants, because the 
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provision of such grants should not be considered a failure if recipients transition out of 
self-employment into other employment immediately following receipt. 
 
 Additionally, the authors make a convincing case that male start-up behavior is 
distinct from female behavior – men exhibit greater labor market attachment due to 
economic reasons (e.g. providing for a family), while women’s labor market attachment 
is instead dictated primarily by their personal demographic factors (e.g. age, education, 
marriage).  
 
 Poland 
 O’Leary (1999) studies a program which provides loans at market interest rates to 
the unemployed in Poland, with the caveat that half of all repayments are waived if the 
firm survives at least two years. O’Leary finds that this program actually leads to a lower 
level of resulting income for recipients.  
 
 Hungary 
 O’Leary (1999) also studies an unemployment benefit scheme in Hungary which 
provides payments up to eighteen months after start-up, with training and counseling on 
entrepreneurial skills. Unlike in Poland, this program leads to higher incomes for 
recipients.  
 
 Romania 
 Rodriguez-Planas (2008) investigates an ALMP program in Romania that 
provides access to capital loans and significant entrepreneurial training and counseling. 
The author identifies positive effects on the employment prospects for recipients, but no 
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income gains for program participants. Strong positive employment effects are identified 
for a subgroup of poorly-educated individuals as well. O’Leary (1999) also analyzed 
survival rates in self-employment and employment gains for participants in start-up 
grants in Romania. 
 
 Denmark 
 Jensen, Ejrnæs, Nielsen, and Würtz (2003), as well as Blume, Ejrnæs, Nielsen, 
and Würtz (2009) examine entitlement to public self-employment support in Denmark, 
finding positive effects on the transition probability of recipients from unemployment to 
self-employment, especially at the point of benefit expiration. 
 
 Finland 
 Tokila (2009) analyzes a Finnish start-up grant program which provides benefits 
to unemployed participants for a maximum of between ten and fifteen months, tied to the 
size of the unemployment benefit given previously to each recipient. The start-up grant 
applicant must undergo publicly-provided entrepreneurial training if they possess no prior 
self-employment experience. Supported start-ups exhibit a lower risk of failure than non-
supported start-ups begun by comparable recipients.  
 
 Sweden 
 Carling and Gustafson (1999) study employment subsidies and self-employment 
grants for the unemployed in Sweden, and find that individuals receiving in-work income 
benefits are more likely to return to unemployment than recipients of self-employment 
grants. Andersson and Wadensjo (2006) look at start-up subsidies provided to Swedish 
men from 1998-2002, and find that such subsidies induce a higher income post-
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participation in the subsidy. This effect is in part due to the benefit of the employment 
office’s business advice, and in part attributed to a “cream-skimming” effect whereby 
only the most qualified individuals were granted the support. 
  
Summary of Available Start-Up Programs in Germany 
 Unemployed individuals in Germany who are capable of working fifteen hours or 
more a week must register with a local welfare office in Germany as soon as they become 
aware that they have been fired or laid off from paid employment, or a self-employment 
venture has failed. A government caseworker at the welfare office, upon registration of 
each claimant, then advises the welfare recipient of his or her rights and duties in the 
welfare system, which includes mandated participation in any of Germany’s complement 
of active labor market programs.  
 This paper discusses the full complement of start-up programs available to 
unemployed laborers in Germany since the 1980s. The Bridging Allowance (BA) was 
introduced in 1986 and was offered to the unemployed until August 2006. In 2003, as 
part of the Hartz Reforms, a new start-up program was introduced entitled “Me, Inc”, 
which was also retired in August 2006. Both of these programs in 2006 were replaced by 
the new “start-up subsidy” (SUS) program, as well as the “Entry Benefit”, both of which 
are still available to this date.  
 
 In 2004, spending on start-up subsidies accounted for roughly 17% of total ALMP 
expenditures (Caliendo and Künn, 2010). Approximately 10% of all registered 
unemployed participated in one of the start-up grant programs available at the time 
(Caliendo and Steiner, 2007). Increases in the total number of start-ups in Germany over 
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time have been driven primarily by equivalent increases in start-up activity by the 
unemployed through these programs. As of 1994, the Federal Employment Agency 
funded only 37,000 business start-ups to the unemployed; but by 2005, the government 
distributed over 250,000 such grants to the unemployed (Mosley, 2008), driven primarily 
by the advent of the “Me, Inc” program (Caliendo and Kritikos, 2007).  
  
 The Bridging Allowance (Überbrückungsgeld): 1986-2006 
 The main goal of this program was to provide for the cost of living necessary to 
support the initial stages of self-employment (Baumgartner and Caliendo, 2008). For the 
first six months following start-up, recipients of the BA were given tax-free payments 
equal in value to the amount the entrepreneur would have received if he or she had 
remained unemployed and on unemployment insurance (Vogler-Ludwig, 2005). 
Additionally, recipients were paid a lump-sum social security contribution equal to (at 
one point) 68.5% of the unemployment support received (Baumgartner and Caliendo, 
2008; Jacobi and Kluve, 2006).  
 
 Applicants to the program had to submit a business plan for approval by a 
competent outside agency, usually the local chamber of commerce. This agency approved 
the business plan if the entrepreneurial venture would, in time, provide a gross monthly 
income representing at least two-thirds of the last labor market income of the 
unemployed individual (Reize, 2000).  
 
 The conditions for receipt of BA funds were highly variable over its long tenure 
as part of Germany’s ALMP framework. For instance, the eligibility conditions for 
getting BA funds were significantly eased in August of 1994, which led to a sharp 
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increase in the number of subsidized persons (Pfeiffer and Reize, 2000a). As of 2000, it 
was required that self-employed recipients work at least eighteen hours per week in the 
start-up (Pfeiffer and Reize, 2000a), which was later limited to a minimum of fifteen 
working hours per week (Mosley, 2008). Prior to 2002, all unemployed individuals were 
eligible if they had received unemployment benefits for a minimum of four weeks prior 
to start-up (Mosley, 2008). In 2002, the restrictions were loosened to allow anyone to 
apply for BA grants, even on the first day of unemployment (Caliendo and Kritikos, 
2007). Additionally, beneficiaries could not apply for additional funding from the 
government until twenty-four months passed after the final BA payment was delivered 
(Vogler-Ludwig, 2005). Following the Hartz Reforms, only ALGI (short-term 
unemployed) recipients or participants in job-creation programs were eligible to receive 
this benefit.  
 
 In the 1990s, roughly fifty thousand entrants were promoted into self-employment 
through these grants (Mosley, 2008), and in 1998 alone, approximately one-fifth of all 
new self-employed in Germany had received BA funds (Reize, 2000). The program was 
terminated in August of 2006. 
 
 “Me, Inc” Subsidies (Ich-AG, Existenzgründungszuschuss) 
 This start-up grant was adopted during the Hartz Reforms in 2003 to augment the 
existing Bridging Allowance program. Payments followed a flat rate degressive schedule 
over three years, given out independent of prior social security contributions or wages. 
During the first year, 600 EUR per month was distributed; in the second year, the 
payments decreased to 360 EUR per month; and in the third and final year, payments 
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were 240 EUR per month. Benefits were paid for a maximum of three years as long as 
the claimant’s income never exceeded 25,000 EUR per year (Jacobi and Kluve, 2006).  
 
 Only ALGI recipients or participants in job-creation programs were eligible to 
receive this benefit (Vogler-Ludwig, 2005). Recipients were required to pay into the 
social insurance system for the duration of benefit receipt (Mosley, 2008; and Caliendo 
and Künn, 2010), and may claim a reduced rate for statutory health insurance (Koch and 
Wiessner, 2003). Beneficiaries could not apply for additional funding from the 
government until twenty-four months passed after the final subsidy payment was 
delivered (Vogler-Ludwig, 2005). Although not initially mandated, a business plan 
requirement identical to the stipulations of the BA was introduced in November 2004 
(Baumgartner and Caliendo, 2008). In its first three years, Ich-AG averaged over one 
hundred thousand entrants per year. The program was also discontinued in August of 
2006. 
 
 Foundation Grants, or SUS (Gründungszuschuss) 
 Despite the BA and Ich-AG programs experiencing moderate success, the two 
programs were replaced in August of 2006 in light of political concerns over their 
potential crowding-out effects on self-employment that would have occurred independent 
of benefit provision (Schneider, 2010). A single new start-up-subsidy program was 
created to offer “foundation grants” to short-term unemployed entrepreneurs.  To be 
eligible for this benefit, applicants must have a remaining unemployment benefit 
entitlement period of at least ninety days, and a business plan approved by an external 
authority (Caliendo and Steiner, 2007). Only recipients of ALGI are eligible to apply for 
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this grant. The subsidy is paid in two phases, the first of which lasts for up to nine months 
and provides a subsidy equal to an individual’s previous unemployment benefit, plus a 
300 EUR lump sum payment for social security contributions. Under certain conditions, 
the benefit may be extended into a second phase for another six months, providing 300 
EUR per month (Caliendo and Steiner, 2007). 
 
 The Entry Benefit (Einstiegsgeld) 
 In 2005, a new program was created to provide start-up grants to persons on 
means-tested ALGII benefits. The Entry Benefit provides a maximum twenty-four month 
subsidy for those who leave unemployment by working in low-pay wage jobs or low-pay 
self-employment (Mosley, 2008). The actual terms of the subsidy are often at the 
discretion of the labor office caseworker; however, the combined entry benefit plus labor 
income must meet constitutionally-mandated minimum requirements for standards of 
living. In 2006 and 2007, an estimated two-thirds of the 50,000 participants in this 
program entered self-employment. (Mosley, 2008). 
 
 Entrepreneurial Training Programs 
 Several start-up training programs are available to recently-unemployed 
entrepreneurs in the German system. In the first-year after start-up, entrepreneurs can 
attend an EU-financed coaching program to provide skills and training for entrepreneurs 
to overcome initial business problems. The Federal Employment Agency also sponsors 
training seminars for those who plan to start a business (Mosley, 2008). Many Länder and 
local/regional chambers of commerce also sponsor training programs to encourage self-
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employment, including counseling on business plans and investment training (Caliendo 
and Künn, 2010).  
 
Descriptive Evidence on Utilization of Start-Up Programs 
 Since 1986, various combinations of these start-up benefits have been available to 
unemployed individuals in the German labor market. However, the crux of the literature 
focuses on the period of dual-availability of the Ich-AG and BA grants, from 2003 
through August 2006. One potential reason for this hyper-concentration of the literature 
lies in the abnormal focus on rigorous scientific evaluation of Hartz programs built into 
the Reform Commission’s legislative proposals, and later conducted by researchers 
across Germany and Switzerland.  
 
 During this period, the unemployed could choose between either Ich-AG or the 
BA, but not both (Caliendo, 2008). Participation of the unemployed in BA had steadily 
increased since its introduction in 1986, and Ich-AG’s introduction in 2003 did not 
replace its usage. In fact, the Ich-AG made self-employment a significantly more 
attractive alternative for the unemployed than prior to the Hartz Reforms (Baumgartner 
and Caliendo, 2008).  
 
 During this period, the two competing programs provided differentiated benefits 
for the same purpose, which led to the development of clear differences in the types of 
unemployed individuals who chose to participate in each program. Due to the design of 
the payment scheme provided in the BA and Ich-AG, “rational” entrepreneurs selected 
which program provided the most funding. When previous earnings (and thus 
unemployment benefits) were high, and/or if expected income from the start-up was to 
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exceed 25,000 EUR, then entrepreneurs favored utilization of the BA (Caliendo, 2008). 
Participants in Ich-AG therefore had lower earnings and lower benefit entitlements than 
BA participants (Caliendo and Künn, 2010).  
 
 Caliendo and Kritikos (2007) argue that participants in Ich-AG were more 
motivated with simply terminating unemployment through participation in this program, 
whereas participants in the BA were more motivated into self-employment out of an 
intrinsic desire to be his/her own boss. For both sets of participants, start-up grants were 
also utilized out of a basic need to “pay the bills”. Important to this study, immigrants 
who utilized the BA exhibited a higher failure rate than natives. The authors identify this 
finding as contrary to the assessment that immigrants exhibit greater natural tendencies 
toward self-employment. However, Caliendo and Kritikos only use German citizenship to 
distinguish between immigrants and non-immigrants, which ignores variation across 
country-of-origin, as well as the thousands of ethnic migrants and naturalized former 
migrants who are lumped with native citizens. 
 
 Ich-AG recipients were on average less qualified in skill and schooling than BA 
recipients (Baumgartner and Caliendo, 2008). Reize (2000) labels BA recipients as “the 
best of those who rise out of unemployment”. BA recipients had a more favorable labor 
market history, and the share of long-term unemployed is much higher among Ich-AG 
recipients than BA (Caliendo and Steiner, 2007). Nearly 75% of BA participants had 
previous experience in the same industry as their start-up, whereas Ich-AG recipients 
predominantly had experience in their start-up industry only accumulated during their 
spare-time (Caliendo and Kritikos, 2007).  
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 Males outnumbered females three-to-one for the BA, but genders were roughly 
equally distributed within for Ich-AG (Baumgartner and Caliendo, 2008). The majority of 
male business founders using the BA were married, and the majority of female 
participants in Ich-AG were married, which suggests that men use the BA for primary 
family income, but women use the BA primarily to generate additional household income 
for a family (Caliendo and Kritikos, 2007). Participants in Ich-AG were on average 
younger in age than BA participants (Caliendo and Künn, 2010). Little evidence was 
gathered on the distribution of foreigners in each of these programs beyond areas in 
which immigrant status overlapped with the traditional descriptive characteristics of 
foreign laborers, notably a lack of education and decreased earnings. 
 
 Little to no research has been conducted on utilization of the foundation grant 
(SUS) system following the August 2006 reorganization of start-up grants, as well as the 
entry benefit and start-up training courses.  
 
Were these programs successful in mobilizing the unemployed?  
 The following portion of Section Five summarizes the current state of the 
literature on German start-up program effectiveness since 1986. Again, the crux of the 
literature on the success of German start-up grant programs focuses on the period from 
2003 to 2006 during which both the Bridging Allowance and Me, Inc. subsidies were 
available. Few studies were conducted prior to 2003, and focused solely on the BA. By 
this paper’s estimation, no systematic evaluations of the entry benefit and foundation 
grant (SUS) systems have been conducted (see Mosley, 2008 for further discussion). 
Furthermore, a marked lack of attention is given in the literature on the effects of these 
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programs on immigrant laborers. All attention given is towards measuring the effect of 
nationality, which is a flawed measure of immigrant status that ignores ethnic German 
migrants and former guest-workers or refugees who have become naturalized. 
 
 Pfeiffer and Reize (2000a) identified no positive effects of BA receipt on the 
survival probability of subsidized firms on an individual level. In fact, subsidized 
foundation led to, ceteris paribus, a reduced survival probability which was only 
statistically significant in East Germany.  However, the outcome variable used in this 
study ignores transitions out of the original start-up into new start-ups or wage 
employment. 90% of firm closures by BA recipients in this sample were actually 
voluntary in nature, rather than forced due to bankruptcy. Immigrants were not addressed 
in this study. Pfeiffer and Reize (2000b) analyzed firm-level data on the effect of BA 
grants, and found similarly that the BA had no positive impact on firm survival and 
employment growth for promoted firms.  
 
 Reize (2000) finds evidence that promotion under BA grant funds actually helped 
individuals overcome liquidity constraints. The estimated survival probability for 
subsidized entrepreneurs is 30% higher than if they had instead chosen wage 
employment. Reize also notes that periods of liberal constraints on BA eligibility led to 
more stable self-employment for the unemployed. Reize also echoes Pfeiffer and Reize 
(2000b) and suggests evidence that the BA helps a highly qualified pool of 
unemployment recipients overcome capital constraints and utilize start-ups to return to 
gainful employment.   
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 Wießner (2001) found that at three years post-startup, 70% of BA participants 
were still self-employed, 13% had transitioned into dependent employment, 11% were 
unemployed, and 6% were taking part in other ALMP measures. Half of the new start-ups 
were profitable even in their first year of business, and steadily increased in profitability 
as time progressed. However, only one-third of participants gained incomes from self-
employment which were higher than pre-start-up. 14% of BA beneficiaries would have 
gone into self-employment even without public support.  
 
 Reize (2004)’s systematic evaluation of start-up grants found that after four years, 
unemployment risks are lower for the self-employed than for non-self-employed, and 
provides indirect evidence that the BA caused this effect. Wießner (2005) found that of 
the individuals who immediately dropped out of Ich-AG receipt, most did so on the basis 
of myopic financial considerations and loose entry rules into the program which failed to 
restrict access. For more than half of eventual hazards out of Ich-AG receipt, these 
entrepreneurs were transitioning into full-time jobs. 
 
 The IAB, DIW, Sinus, GfA, and infas (2005) evaluation of the BA found that six 
months after BA expires, the positive employment effect is still significant and large, 
especially for women. Jacobi and Kluve (2006) examined previous studies on Ich-AG 
receipt, and identified the understanding that Ich-AG benefits exhibit significantly 
positive employment effects early on due to locking-in, but that windfall gains were 
reported by many who would have started their own businesses of their own accord. 
Jacobi and Kluve do not address immigrant responses to the Ich-AG. 
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 Caliendo and Steiner (2007) conducted an analysis of both BA and Ich-AG based 
upon register data and follow-up interviews with recipients at twenty-eight months post 
start-up. These authors found that more people returned to wage employment from the 
BA than from Ich-AG. At twenty-eight months post start-up, participants in both 
programs earn more on average than non-participants. The authors do not distinguish 
between foreign and native recipients of each benefit. This analysis of Ich-AG is biased 
by partial locking-in effects, in that upon final measurement of firm success, 
entrepreneurs were still receiving state-support in the third year of the subsidy.  
 
 Caliendo and Kritikos (2007) found that survival rates of start-ups were higher for 
Ich-AG than the BA, but attributes this finding to the same locking-in effects observed by 
Caliendo and Steiner (2007). In the first few months after start-up, few differences in 
survival rates of firms exist. For the BA, an interview conducted twenty-two months 
following cessation of start-up grants reveals that only 10.7% of male recipients lapsed 
back into unemployment (9.2% of females), 71.0% of men are still self-employed, and 
13.2% have moved into regular employment. For males in this study, around 55% of 
those receiving either the BA or Ich-AG funds made higher earnings than their immediate 
past position in wage-employment. Additionally, direct employment effects of subsidized 
entrepreneurs hiring employees are significant for BA recipients, but not for Ich-AG 
recipients.  
 
 One of the main criticisms levied against the BA and Ich-AG, in fact the reason 
for termination of these two programs, was that such start-up grants crowded out natural 
transitions to self-employment, and instead paid money to individuals who would have 
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become self-employed anyhow. Caliendo and Kritikos (2007) state that roughly 50% of 
recipients in the BA would have become self-employed even without subsidization, but 
that number falls to around 33% for the Ich-AG. Despite these claims, a survival analysis 
suggests that recipients who would have started firms independently without 
subsidization may have been less successful in doing so without public support.  
 Baumgartner and Caliendo (2008) suffer from the same locking-in problems 
found in previous studies, and thus offer only short and medium-run evaluations of these 
programs. They find strong positive employment and income effects for participants 
compared to non-participants. At twenty-eight months post start-up, male and female 
recipients of the BA were 17% less likely to return to unemployment due to their 
participation. Male recipients of Ich-AG were 28% less likely to return to unemployment, 
and females were 18% less likely.  
 
 Caliendo (2008) addresses start-ups in the understudied East Germany, and finds 
strong positive locking-in effects in the short run. Male participants in Ich-AG spend 
approximately 13.9 fewer months in unemployment than nonparticipants, while females 
spent 16.4 fewer months in unemployment. Male participants in BA spent roughly 11.6 
fewer months in unemployment than nonparticipants, while females spent 11.1 fewer 
months in unemployment. The level of unemployment benefit provided to East German 
entrepreneurs is significantly and positively associated with employment success for the 
BA, but negatively and significantly associated with employment success for the Ich-AG 
(Caliendo, 2008).  
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 Caliendo and Künn (2010) analyze West German start-ups at 28 months and 56 
months post-start-up, and remove the locking-in bias found in most previous studies of 
the Ich-AG. At 56 months, participants in Ich-AG had a 15.6% higher probability of not 
being registered as unemployed, while participants in BA only had a 10.6% higher 
probability. The overall employment probability of Ich-AG recipients increased 22.1%, 
and 14.5% for BA. The authors note that at five years post-start-up, the positive effects of 
participation are rather stable for BA recipients, but less so for Ich-AG recipients, who 
only ceased benefit receipt two years prior. Overall, adjusting for locking-in effects of 
support during self-employment, participants in Ich-AG spent on average 5.5 months 
than non-participants (during the post-program observation period) in self-employment or 
regular employment. BA participants spent on average 10.8 months longer than non-
participants. Both programs thus gave participants a 20% advantage (based upon the 
post-program observation period) in holding onto stable employment.  Participants also 
received strong earnings benefits over non-participants.  
 
 Several factors differentially affected the probability of success post start-up. 
With regards to the human capital of participants, only for the Ich-AG did survival rates 
of businesses increase with a higher school degree (Caliendo and Kritikos, 2007). 
Baumgartner and Caliendo (2008) likewise found that schooling does not predict success 
for BA or Ich-AG receipt. Male BA start-ups in craft and construction sectors and male 
Ich-AG start-ups in the information technology sector were more likely to survive than 
other industries. Female start-ups with BA funds in the retail sector had relatively lower 
survival rates than other industries (Caliendo and Kritikos, 2007). 
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 Longer expected unemployment duration had a negative impact on survival for all 
start-ups (Baumgartner and Caliendo, 2008; and Caliendo and Künn, 2010). Also, 
deciding to pursue self-employment for fear of termination of unemployment benefits 
decreased the survival probability of start-ups, while proactive reasons for desiring self-
employment actually increased survival probabilities (Caliendo and Kritikos, 2007). In all 
groups except male BA start-ups, older age predicted longer survival of businesses 
(Caliendo and Kritikos, 2007). Pfeiffer and Reize (2000a) and Vogler-Ludwig (2005) 
identify a significant and non-linear influence of age on survival probability for male 
start-ups under the BA, whereby survival probability peaks around forty-five years old. 
Overall, the SUS was more effective for older participants, and vice versa with the BA 
(Caliendo and Künn, 2010). Foundations under the BA were more successful for men 
than for women, and married/partnered entrepreneurs were also more successful (Vogler-
Ludwig, 2005).  
 
 In all, these studies show the generally successful nature of start-up programs in 
Germany. The BA appears to not only adequately integrate entrepreneurs back into the 
market, but also create new jobs in subsidized start-ups. Despite most studies being too 
preliminary to parse out the true locking-in effects from Ich-AG’s participants, these 
subsidies similarly helped many unemployed gain traction in the labor market. Some Ich-
AG individuals appear to have experienced gains from receiving subsidies for a start-up 
which they would have begun independent of support.   
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 Findings for Subsidized Immigrants 
 Of these analyses, a very small number actually address immigrant status in their 
research. Reize (2000) includes a “foreigner” specification in his survival analyses of 
start-ups out of unemployment, but does not interact this variable with the dummy 
variables he constructs to estimate the impact of the BA on these start-ups. As a result, 
the impact of these grants on the employment prospects of these foreigners cannot be 
fully assessed to discover the full impact of “foreigner” status in Reize’s model. It is 
unclear whether this “foreigner” specification includes naturalized immigrants. 
 
 Caliendo and Kritikos (2007) include a variable measuring German citizenship in 
their survival analysis of subsidized firms, but use this variable as an imperfect proxy for 
“immigrant” status in describing their findings. As stated previously, treating German 
citizens as non-immigrants ignores variation caused by ethnic German migrants and 
naturalized former guest-workers, their families, and humanitarian migrants. For the BA, 
the authors find that being “non-German” significantly increases the probability of 
exiting self-employment following start-up for both men and women. For Ich-AG, 
positive but not significant effects for non-German participants were found, although not 
significant. Although painting a poor picture for the performance of these programs for 
immigrants, the specification of the hazard in this model fails to address individuals who 
exit the subsidized start-up for regular employment or an additional start-up, which in 
previous studies has encompassed a large portion of those who “hazard” out of the 
subsidized start-up. 
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 Baumgartner and Caliendo (2008), Caliendo (2008), and Caliendo and Künn 
(2010) include a similar nationality variable in their analyses of the effects of 
participation on the subsidized firms. All three studies estimate propensity score 
coefficients, including nationality as a control variable, in an effort to identify true 
difference-in-difference effects of treatment. Caliendo (2008) finds insignificant effects 
of the BA and Ich-AG for non-Germans in East Germany. Caliendo and Künn (2010) 
state that results are mixed based upon nationality. Their findings suggest that natives 
outperform non-Germans in response to the BA, not the Ich-AG. 
 
 Overall, the scarce few studies that even mention foreigners in the context of self-
employment promotion produce tenuous results at best, and suggest that non-citizens 
were less successful than natives in start-ups subsidized by the BA and had relatively 
comparable responses to natives with the Ich-AG. Many of these analyses are flawed by 
an imperfect choice of measurement for migration status, including German citizenship 
measures rather than an indicator of migration history and therefore ignore large variation 
in labor market abilities across native-born Germans, ethnic German resettlers, and 
naturalized former migrants. These few studies, in their discussion of results, tend to treat 
nationality as a control variable rather than a possible explanatory factor, and generally 
fail to discuss any effect heterogeneity across nationality as part of the overall analysis. 
Several were biased by locking-in effects still present in the data on Ich-AG, and others 
suffered from a poor specification of the “hazard” out of subsidized self-employment 
which ignores transitions into wage-employment. The existing evidence on the effects of 
these programs on immigrants is minimal and simply unconvincing.  
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 It is important to note that no single study of German start-up programs has 
adopted or examined the hypothesis developed in this paper, that self-employment 
promotion offers immigrants an opportunity to overcome labor market struggles and 
reach employment parity with natives. Most analyses of start-up grants fail to even 
mention the responses of foreigners to these grants. Essentially, no analysis has uniquely 
or effectively examined immigrant behavior under public self-employment promotion.  
 
 In the next three sections, this paper will build upon the literature and historical 
context established in this first portion of the analysis. It is clear, immigrants are at a 
disadvantage in the labor market. Self-employment offers immigrants in Germany an 
opportunity to approach earnings and employment parity with natives, and public self-
employment promotion has the potential to mobilize unemployed immigrants who have 
borne the brunt of the labor market difficulties of non-Germans back into stable 
employment and off of the government’s budget.  
 
 Inadequate and scarce research has been conducted on the ability of self-
employment promotion to actively improve the employment prospects of immigrants 
compared to natives as hypothesized. This paper will now empirically assess the ability 
of start-up grants to mobilize unemployed immigrants in such a manner. 
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SECTION SIX: DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 The German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), administered through DIW-Berlin 
and Cornell University, offers twenty-four waves of data on subjects in both East and 
West Germany from 1983 through 2008.  This longitudinal structure offers researchers an 
opportunity to study long-term questions of labor market outcomes using highly 
reputable and statistically powerful data.  Although gathered via annual interviews, the 
dataset has the advantage of carefully tracking the unemployment, employment, and out-
of-labor-force status of all participants on a monthly basis for the year preceding the 
interview. The data include variables on migration history, labor market prospects, 
human capital, and demographic matters. The GSOEP also oversamples immigrants 
residing in Germany, including former guest-workers, immigrants arriving in the 1980s, 
and ethnic German migrants. Such an oversampling is ideal for this study.  
 
 Despite the dearth of literature on newer self-employment subsidies like the 
Einstiegsgeld and foundation grants, this study will focus solely on the effects of the 
Bridging Allowance from 1983, the first wave of the study, through 1993. This is done 
for two reasons: 
(1) At the time of analysis, the GSOEP is only available through the 2008 wave, 
and as such, limited data has been collected on potential recipients of these 
more recent benefits. The effects of these self-employment promotion 
programs are difficult to ascertain so soon after benefit provision.  
(2) Although identifying the exact monthly beginning and end dates of self-
employment spells in years 1983-1993, the GSOEP discontinues collecting 
this data for the 1995 wave and onward. Because of the importance of exact 
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identification of the progression of each individual through different labor 
market states to this analysis, a lack of specificity in the precise origin of self-
employment spells relative to earlier unemployment or employment is highly 
problematic. See Appendix A for further discussion of the 1994-2008 data, 
and attempts to rectify the lack of explicit identification of self-employment 
spells in this data. 
 
 As a result, this analysis will focus on the provision of Bridging Allowance (BA) 
benefits in the first eleven waves of the GSOEP, through 1993. The GSOEP does not 
uniquely identify recipients of the Bridging Allowance as a part of its available data. 
Other studies examining self-employment promotion in Germany utilize shorter panel or 
cross-section administrative data that allows such an identification to be made, but this 
administrative data is of limited availability to researchers outside of Germany. In a 
method derived from Reize (2000), this analysis will utilize exogenous policy changes in 
the administration of the BA to gauge the impact of these benefits on individuals who 
transition out of unemployment within the GSOEP.  
  
 The BA was first made available to unemployed individuals on January 1st, 1986. 
As a result, individuals exiting unemployment in the first three years of the GSOEP did 
so without the possibility of receiving start-up funds from the welfare office. This period 
will be treated as phase one of public self-employment promotion in this study. Through 
July 30th, 1988, the BA provided generous benefits rather liberally, requiring participants 
to have a minimum previous monthly gross income of only 1000 DM and to have been 
unemployed for 4-10 weeks. Benefits were given for up to six months’ time, and were 
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equivalent to previous earnings before unemployment. This period shall be considered 
the second, or “generous” phase of BA administration.  By the beginning of August 1988, 
however, the BA began to restrict eligibility requirements and benefit generosity. 
Required previous monthly gross income tripled to the level of 3400 DM, and individuals 
received a maximum level of benefits that began at 350 DM per week, but were reduced 
in value as a result of further policy changes within this period. The duration of benefit 
receipt during this period was restricted to provide individuals who had been unemployed 
for only a short time with benefits for a shorter period of time following initial start-up of 
a company. In other words, the harder to mobilize out of unemployment (those who had 
been unemployed for an extended period of time) received support payments for the 
longest, and vice versa. Funding for the program was restricted to a maximum total 
amount from year to year (unlike in the initial phase of BA availability, phase two, where 
funds were unrestricted from year to year). This third period of limited benefit 
availability and generosity shall be considered the “restricted” phase of BA promotion in 
this study. 
 
  Table Three summarizes these phases and the distinctions raised between benefit 
availability and generosity. These exogenous administrative changes endow the period 
from 1983 to 1993 with a full spectrum of self-employment promotion generosity and 
availability. The null status of no promotion is given for 1983-1985, along with a period 
of generous and liberal support of self-employment out of unemployment through 1988, 
and a period of more moderate and conditional support for entrepreneurial promotion 
through 1993. This analysis will examine differences in the ability of natives and 
foreigners to successfully exit unemployment via self-employment during these various 
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phases of BA provision, seeking to identify trends in the availability/generosity of these 
benefits and the success of immigrant and native entrepreneurs.  
 
 Summary statistics for all individuals in the GSOEP from 1983 to 1993 are given 
in Table Four. The data sample men and women roughly evenly with an average age of 
40 years old. 64% of the sample has a high school education, and only 11% have any 
college education. About 84% of the sample is from West Germany. “Foreigner” is 
defined in this analysis based upon a construction of variables in the GSOEP which 
respectively identify citizenship, country of origin, arrival year to Germany, and 
attachment to a home country. All individuals born in a foreign country are treated as 
“foreign”, as are second (and third, etc.) generation immigrants who are not naturalized. 
This variable is markedly different from most previous studies of immigrants and self-
TABLE THREE: PHASES OF SELF-EMPLOYMENT PROMOTION 
Phase Dates 
Required 
Unemployment 
Duration 
Required 
Hours/ 
Week 
Required 
Previous Gross 
Monthly Income 
Duration of 
Promotion 
Amount of 
Promotion Funding 
1 1/1/83 - 
12/31/85 
No Promotion No 
Promotion 
No Promotion No Promotion No 
Promotion 
No Promotion 
1/1/86 - 
12/31/87 
10 Weeks 19 1000 DM 13 Weeks UE 
Benefit 
Level 
Unrestricted 2 
1/1/88 - 
7/30/88 
4 Weeks 19 1000 DM 6 Months UE 
Benefit 
Level 
Unrestricted 
8/1/88 - 
10/30/88 
Variable 19 3400 DM 13 - 26 Weeks, 
Varies by 
Duration of 
Unemployment 
Max 350 
DM / 
week 
Restricted 
11/1/88 - 
12/31/88 
No Promotion No 
Promotion 
No Promotion No Promotion No 
Promotion 
No Promotion 
1/1/89 - 
5/31/89 
Variable 19 3400 DM 8-26 Weeks, 
Varies by 
Duration of 
Unemployment 
Max 300 
DM / 
week 
Restricted 
6/1/89 - 
12/31/92 
Variable 19 3400 DM 8-26 Weeks, 
Varies by 
Duration of 
Unemployment 
Max 300 
DM / 
week 
Restricted 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1/1/93 - 
12/31/93 
Variable 19 3500 DM 8-26 Weeks, 
Varies by 
Duration of 
Unemployment 
Max 300 
DM / 
week 
Restricted 
Sources: Reize (2000), Kaiser and Otto (1990), Brinkman and Otto (1996), Wießner (1998), and SGB III 
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employment subsidies, which treat “nationality” as a proxy for immigrant status. 30% of 
the sample is therefore defined as a “foreigner”, 9% of whom are also citizens of 
Germany. 21.6% of all foreigners in this sample are former guest-workers, and 8.2% of 
all foreigners are of Turkish descent. In terms of the sectoral distribution of the sample, 
roughly equal amounts are found in the manufacturing, blue-collar service and white-
collar service industries. 
TABLE FOUR: SUMMARY STATISTICS, 1983-1993 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Demographic      
Sex (Male = 1) 149594 0.4902269 0.4999061 0 1 
Age 149594 39.97678 16.8198 1 97 
Married 138283 0.6041451 0.4890353 0 1 
Number of Children 148083 0.7440084 1.024595 0 9 
Savings Account 142660 0.7907683 0.4067616 0 1 
            
Labor Market      
Average Monthly Wage in WE 149436 580.9226 762.2568 0 29419.74 
Average Monthly Wage in SE 149436 65.93824 444.2507 0 37307.69 
High School Education 148214 0.6448918 0.4785477 0 1 
Any College Education 148214 0.1112715 0.3144692 0 1 
West Germany 149429 0.8367452 0.3695992 0 1 
Vocational Training (Ever Completed) 147191 0.3613264 0.4803865 0 1 
Speaks German 147232 0.928813 0.2571378 0 1 
Work Experience 14456 13.4117 12.96069 0 54 
Occupational Disability 145927 0.0781761 0.2684494 0 1 
            
Sector      
Mining 146388 0.0048501 0.069474 0 1 
Manufacturing  146388 0.1824876 0.3862472 0 1 
Blue Collar Service  146388 0.1689278 0.3746894 0 1 
White Collar Service 146388 0.1085471 0.3110713 0 1 
            
Type of Self-Employment      
Family-Based Self Employment 141919 0.004869 0.0696082 0 1 
Self Employed with Employees 141919 0.0288263 0.1673187 0 1 
Freelance Self Employment 141919 0.0115066 0.1066501 0 1 
            
Migration      
Foreigner 141919 0.3033344 0.4596999 0 1 
Foreigner*Citizen 149594 0.0901055 0.2863338 0 1 
Guestworker 149436 0.2162263 0.4116718 0 1 
Turkish Descent 149436 0.0816068 0.2737657 0 1 
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 Table Five describes all spells of self-employment observed in the sample, broken 
down by year and the labor force state from which the self-employment originated. In 
each year, between 87 and 208 self-employment spells are observed to have risen out of 
unemployment, providing 1,271 self-employment spells in this sample that were 
theoretically eligible to have received the BA.  In the sample, significantly more self-
employment spells rise out of unemployment than from wage-employment or out-of-
labor force status. Variations in the frequency of post-unemployment self-employment 
between each year are primarily due to the addition of new subsamples to the GSOEP, 
notably the sample of East Germans added to the dataset in 1990.  
 
TABLE FIVE: ORIGINS OF SELF-EMPLOYMENT 
Year Unemployment Wage-Employment OLF Spell Total 
1983 87 0 0 87 
1984 110 61 18 189 
1985 107 65 13 185 
1986 93 71 23 187 
1987 90 91 20 201 
1988 91 53 10 154 
1989 96 51 6 153 
1990 208 51 19 278 
1991 137 73 7 217 
1992 130 69 17 216 
1993 122 62 10 194 
Total 1271 647 143 2061 
 
 To assess the impact of the BA from 1983 to 1993, three sets of analyses are 
completed in this study. First, a survival analysis of individuals who rise out of 
unemployment into self-employment is conducted to ascertain differential effects of BA 
provision on immigrants and natives. Second, panel models are constructed to assess the 
impact of BA provision on the income of individuals who exit unemployment for self-
employment, both in their initial spells of self-employment and in ensuing wage-
employed jobs. Finally, these same models are used to analyze the impact of the BA on 
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the income of individuals who choose self-employment compared to individuals who left 
unemployment instead for wage-employment. Between these three analyses, a clearer 
picture of the effect of public self-employment promotion on natives and foreigners will 
be developed based upon this data. Results are given in the next section.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   80	  
SECTION SEVEN: RESULTS  
 To begin the analysis, a multiple-failure time-varying-covariate duration 
framework is established to assess the probability that individuals who exit 
unemployment for self-employment remain gainfully employed in the months following 
initial subsidization. Because the goal of start-up subsidization is not to establish a class 
of permanently self-employed individuals per se, but rather to use self-employment as a 
means through which labor market experience and future employment can be attained, a 
“failure” in this analysis is defined as the first instance of unemployment following 
subsidization. As a result, and unlike some previous studies (see Cueto and Mato, 2006, 
for a discussion), resulting spells of wage employment or new start-ups are treated as 
identical to a continuation of the original start-up. This framework should produce a more 
accurate gauge of the impact of self-employment promotion on the overall employability 
of unemployed individuals. Self-employed farmers are dropped from the sample due to 
the seasonal nature of their employment. 
 
 Three specifications are estimated, and their results are shown in Table Six. The 
first two survival models uses a Weibull specification to estimate, rather than assume, the 
underlying shape parameter of the baseline hazard model. A broad model using a larger 
complement of covariates is estimated first, followed by a more parsimonious model with 
fewer covariates. Results are consistent between these two specifications. The third 
column depicts a semi-parametric Cox proportional hazards model on the same 
covariates, which does not require a baseline hazard specification. A Hausman test fails 
when assessing the consistency of the Weibull estimation of the baseline hazard against 
the Cox estimates, however, at face value the two models produce similar estimates.  
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(1) (2) (3)
1983-1993 1983-1993 1983-1993
Weibull Weibull Cox
VARIABLES Hazard Ratio Hazard Ratio Hazard Ratio
Demographic
Sex 0.939 0.949 0.813**
(0.143) (0.0888) (0.0694)
ln(Age) 1.688 1.746** 1.321*
(0.594) (0.385) (0.218)
Married 0.918
(0.144)
Number of Children 0.966
(0.0749)
Savings Account 1.114 1.084 1.002
(0.156) (0.109) (0.00292)
Labor Market
High School Education 0.973
(0.245)
West Germany 1.624** 1.623*** 2.210***
(0.343) (0.239) (0.318)
Vocational Training 0.638*** 0.606*** 0.991***
(0.102) (0.0546) (0.00248)
Speaks German 0.497* 0.574** 0.978***
(0.206) (0.140) (0.00532)
Work Experience 0.992 0.992 1.000
(0.00958) (0.00593) (0.000134)
Occupational Disability 1.282
(0.636)
Sector
Mining
Manufacturing 0.739 0.733** 0.984***
(0.184) (0.0992) (0.00469)
Blue Collar Service 0.797 0.782** 0.990***
(0.143) (0.0812) (0.00300)
White Collar Service 0.522*** 0.510*** 0.987***
(0.105) (0.0626) (0.00335)
Type of Self-Employment
Family-Based Self Employment 0.326*** 0.302*** 1.000
(0.105) (0.0764) (0.00644)
Self Employed with Employees 0.239*** 0.238*** 0.977***
(0.0441) (0.0265) (0.00347)
Freelance Self Employment 0.612*** 0.601*** 0.998
(0.114) (0.0634) (0.00304)
Migration
Foreigner 1.543 0.775 0.860
(1.150) (0.127) (0.143)
Foreigner*Citizen 0.546
(0.350)
Guest-worker 0.487
(0.325)
Turkish Descent 0.370** 0.373** 0.352***
(0.172) (0.148) (0.138)
Phases of Promotion
Phase 1: No Promotion 0.784 0.790** 0.931
-0.154 (0.0927) (0.108)
Phase 2: Generous BA 0.762 0.765** 0.857
-0.145 (0.0937) (0.106)
Phase 3: Restricted BA
Interactions
Phase 1 * Foreigner 0.784 1.180 1.061
(0.154) (0.281) (0.248)
Phase 2 * Foreigner 0.762 1.569* 1.428
(0.145) (0.388) (0.354)
Phase 3 * Foreigner
Constant 0.0492** 0.0365***
(0.0670) (0.0301)
Observations 2714 2798 2798
SE in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Reference
Reference
Reference
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 All coefficients reported are hazard ratios (centered around one) and indicate, for 
each month following subsidization out of unemployment into self-employment, the 
probability that each individual will lapse back into unemployment conditional on the 
probability of remaining employed (“surviving”) to that month.  Focusing on the Cox 
estimates, these results indicate that men remain employed marginally longer than 
women after leaving unemployment, and younger individuals likewise have more job 
stability. Surprisingly, individuals in West Germany are more likely to lapse back into 
unemployment at each point in time than East Germans. Speaking German and having 
ever completed vocational training lead to significant reductions in the probability of 
lapsing back into unemployment. Relatively comparable effects are seen across the 
manufacturing and service sectors relative to those employed in mining and extraction.  
 
 Interpretation of the interaction variables is complicated. The Weibull 
specification finds significant parameter estimates for several of the foreign and phase 
dummy variables, while the Cox specification finds weaker effects. Based upon these 
coefficients and interactions, Table Seven lists the log-relative hazard rates for 
immigrants and natives in each phase, across both specifications.  Each hazard rate is 
given relative to the conditional probability that a native lapses back into unemployment 
in phase three, the period of restricted BA provision. Foreigners are distinguished 
between Turks and Non-Turks, using the strongly significant coefficient on the Turkish 
Descent dummy variable in both the Weibull and Cox specifications.  
 
 Although the sizes of coefficients across specifications are different, these 
estimates depict strikingly similar trends for both the Weibull and Cox versions. Natives 
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appear to have a lower probability of becoming unemployed in phase two, the period of 
liberal BA promotion, than in phases one and three. This suggests that natives respond 
positively to self-employment promotion and last longer in gainful employment after 
leaving unemployment when the BA is readily available. Turks are less likely than 
natives to lapse back into unemployment in all phases, consistent with previous findings 
in the literature regarding the entrepreneurial nature and abilities of these immigrants in 
Germany (see e.g. Constant and Shachmurove, 2003, 2005). Foreigners, per these 
estimates, are also less likely to lapse back into unemployment than natives in phases one 
and three. These two findings suggest positive “catching-up” effects for foreigners and 
Turks in subsidized self-employment relative to natives, especially during the third phase 
of BA promotion.  Despite this fact, employment stability for all groups in phase three is 
about comparable to the probability of lapsing back into unemployment without any 
promotion. Some early analyses of the BA in the literature found similar minor or 
insignificant benefits of BA receipt, (e.g. Pfeiffer and Reize (2000). However, in failing 
to separate out immigrant effects, these findings may disguise the “catch-up” benefits of 
the BA for foreigners relative to natives. 
TABLE SEVEN: CALCULATION OF PHASE EFFECTS 
    
(1983-1993 Cox Specification)   
 Non-Turk Foreigner Turk Native 
Phase1 -0.148 -0.796 -0.069 
Phase2 0.145 -0.503 -0.143 
Phase3 -0.14 -0.788 0 
    
(1983-1993 Weibull Specification)   
 Non-Turk Foreigner Turk Native 
Phase1 -0.255 -0.882 -0.21 
Phase2 0.109 -0.518 -0.235 
Phase3 -0.225 -0.852 0 
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 After comparing coefficients across phases within each group of foreigners, it 
appears that all foreigners (Turks included) are more likely to lapse back into 
unemployment when the initial start-up benefits are more generous and readily available. 
The estimates in phase two for non-Turk foreigners and Turks alike reveal that the 
employment of these individuals is more stable when initial start-up benefits are harder to 
get and less generous (phase three). This effect is not seen for natives, where as 
mentioned earlier, they are less likely to lapse back into unemployment when initial 
benefits are more generous and readily available. Although statistical significance is 
difficult to calculate based upon these interaction variables, this effect is robust across 
both the Weibull and Cox specifications and is relatively large in size (approximately 
thirty percentage point difference for foreigners between phase two and three, and 
comparable difference in phase two between non-Turk foreigners and natives).  
 
 This finding suggests a potential difference between immigrants and natives with 
regards to the design of self-employment subsidies. Where no such effect exists for 
natives, there appears to be a negative relationship between the skill-level of foreign 
recipients of self-employment subsidies and the generosity of those benefits. Assume for 
the moment that only a small proportion of foreigners possess the business acumen and 
entrepreneurial abilities to effectively found a business. In phase two, if the Bridging 
Allowance provides very generous benefits to a relatively large amount of people, it is 
entirely feasible that individuals who are ill-prepared to enter self-employment are 
incentivized to take up the generous and easily accessible benefits. In this case and as 
shown in the results above, the average probability that subsidized individuals lapse back 
into unemployment would actually increase.  
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 Furthermore, when benefits are restricted in phase three, fewer ill-prepared 
individuals hypothetically then enter self-employment from unemployment. Only the 
immigrants who possess the skill necessary to start a business (but perhaps not the start-
up capital) would likely use the BA to engage in somewhat risky entrepreneurial activity, 
and the average probability that subsidized individuals lapse back into unemployment 
should decrease relative to phase two. Natives would hypothetically not exhibit this 
similar pattern if a larger proportion possess the business acumen necessary to start a 
business (as found in the literature), and start-up grants provide capital primarily to 
skillful individuals who simply lack the money necessary to do so. This stylized scenario 
depicts a likely underlying cause of the effects found in Table Seven, but is worthy of 
further consideration in this paper. 
 
 Overall, immigrants appear to lapse back into unemployment less frequently as a 
result of BA receipt than natives on average. Estimates still reveal few statistically 
significant benefits of these subsidies for either group compared to the status quo of no 
self-employment promotion. The next section will delve into the effect of varying levels 
of BA provision on income, hoping to assess the robustness of the survival analysis 
findings and any effects of these subsidies that exist beyond their perhaps impact on job 
stability.  
 
Income Analysis Findings 
 The GSOEP reports pre-tax income from wage employment and self-employment 
in yearly form, and from those values, average monthly wage income and self-
employment income can be determined for every individual and every year under 
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observation. These incomes are adjusted by the author for inflation by region, and 
transformed into log-form. To assess the effects of these three phases of BA provision on 
the resulting income of individuals who choose self-employment out of unemployment, a 
panel data framework can be developed to accurately control for person-specific effects 
beyond the abilities of simple OLS or Tobit regression. As such, a panel model is 
constructed which treats every month from January 1983 through December 1993 as a 
new potential wave. This method allows for measurement of self-employment income 
when multiple self-employment spells occur within a year, and allows income and 
covariates to vary from year-to-year if a spell occurs over multiple calendar years. Every 
spell is therefore represented with at least one wave of income and covariate data, 
assigned to the starting month of that spell within a year. To account for the fact that 
individuals with lengthy single or multiple separate spells are oversampled by this 
technique, an inverse weight is applied to each “wave” based upon the total number of 
months an individual is observed in the GSOEP and the number of months that that 
individual then spends in post-unemployment self-employment and other jobs 
immediately following start-up. 
 
 Table Eight presents the findings of seven panel models constructed to assess the 
income profile of natives and foreigners who exit unemployment for self-employment. 
The first four columns depict fixed effects regressions which measure “within” variation 
as individuals progress through the German labor market over time. Because these 
regressions can only trace the impact of covariates for each individual over time and not 
“across” or “between” individuals, separate regressions are run for natives and foreigners. 
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The importance of other variables that do not change within an individual over time 
cannot be assessed by this methodology.  
  
 These fixed effects regressions are calculated first for the initial spell of self-
employment that follows unemployment, shown for natives and foreigners separately in 
columns (1) and (2). Although all wage-employment spells following the initial self-
employment phase can be identified as distinct from ensuing self-employment spells, 
sample sizes are too small to analyze income solely in each of these wage spells. 
However, fixed effects estimates can be calculated which combine all spells following 
the initial self-employment, including any ensuing wage jobs or alternative self-
employment ventures not interrupted by a lapse back into unemployment. This pooled 
regression, especially in comparison to income determinants for initial self-employment, 
should inform a discussion of the greater income profile resulting from start-up subsidies.  
 
 The results seen in Table Eight show a strong positive relationship between age 
and income for natives in both the initial self-employment spell following 
unemployment, and when ensuing distinct employment spells are analyzed.  Age 
becomes a significant and positive predictor of income for foreigners when ensuing 
distinct employment spells are addressed. This suggests that the initial self-employment 
spell following unemployment may allow inexperienced or youthful foreigners an 
opportunity to gain labor market experience and income of their own accord prior to 
entering later wage-jobs which value experience more heavily and reward that experience 
with higher wages.   
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 Natives in manufacturing jobs (whether in the first self-employment phase or in 
ensuing employment spells) exhibit higher incomes relative to other industries. Native 
blue-collar service workers exhibit similarly high incomes, although smaller in 
magnitude. Foreigners receive no added income relative to other industries for becoming 
self-employed in manufacturing following unemployment, or in ensuing employment 
spells following initial self-employment. However, foreigners in the blue-collar service 
sector make significantly less money than in other sectors. Family-based self-
employment exhibits positive income effects relative to other types of self-employment 
for foreigners, but negative effects for natives. Self-employed foreigners who hire 
employees also have relatively large income effects relative to other types of self-
employment. Natives do not experience these same effects. 
 
 The phase dummy variables are of the most importance to this study, and they 
indicate similar trends as discovered in the survival analysis portion of this paper. 
Relative to phase three, the restrictive period of BA provision, foreigners (Turks 
included) receive significantly lower incomes in initial self-employment spells which 
begin during the generous period of benefit provision (phase two). This effect holds when 
these foreigners enter ensuing distinct wage and self-employment spells, although it is 
reduced in significance. This provides further evidence that more generous benefits 
induce the participation of ill-prepared foreigners in self-employment. Relative to the 
initial period of no promotion, foreigners on average make less income in phase two. For 
foreigners in their initial spell of self-employment, income in phase three (restricted 
provision of BA payments) is marginally higher than income in the initial phase of no  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Random Effects
Initial SE Ensuing WE Pooled
VARIABLES Natives Foreigners Natives Foreigners All
Demographic
Sex 0.491*** 0.651*** 0.544***
(0.0658) (0.109) (0.0627)
ln(Age) 3.648** 2.357 5.696*** 8.154* 0.0153 -0.551** 0.134
(1.528) (2.833) (1.499) (4.794) (0.131) (0.229) (0.125)
Married 0.400*** -0.254*** 0.374***
(0.0632) (0.0735) (0.0598)
Number of Children -0.229* -0.0584 -0.203 -0.182 -0.141*** 0.00966 -0.127***
(0.134) (0.0761) (0.129) (0.150) (0.0320) (0.0393) (0.0304)
Labor Market
Any College Education -0.0987 0.514*** -0.140**
(0.0711) (0.133) (0.0675)
West Germany 0.0146 0.485*** -0.0244
(0.105) (0.165) (0.100)
Vocational Training 0.206 0.0192 0.251 0.0695 0.199*** 0.0689 0.257***
(0.182) (0.233) (0.189) (0.272) (0.0573) (0.0694) (0.0553)
Speaks German 0.0579 0.392* 0.00427
(0.189) (0.229) (0.176)
Work Experience -0.0492 -0.0169 -0.0698 -0.160 0.000438 0.0282*** -0.00339
(0.0522) (0.0844) (0.0537) (0.136) (0.00435) (0.00631) (0.00414)
Occupational Disability -0.0532 -0.267 -0.155
(0.148) (0.164) (0.136)
Sector
Mining
Manufacturing 0.824*** 0.0976 0.488*** -1.090 0.148* -0.271*** -0.145**
(0.184) (0.180) (0.187) (0.752) (0.0756) (0.0886) (0.0695)
Blue Collar Service 0.588** -0.377** 0.320* -0.306 0.505*** 0.107 0.390***
(0.230) (0.190) (0.177) (0.258) (0.0632) (0.0816) (0.0596)
White Collar Service 0.0894 0.936 -0.0218 0.468 0.343*** 0.160** 0.219***
(0.148) (0.569) (0.174) (0.367) (0.0646) (0.0784) (0.0614)
Type of Self-Employment
Family-Based Self Employment -0.338* 0.830*** -0.352 0.432** -0.201* -0.319***
(0.176) (0.297) (0.228) (0.209) (0.107) (0.0984)
Self-Employment with Employees 0.164 0.706*** 0.0760 0.625*** 0.395*** 0.270***
(0.151) (0.223) (0.124) (0.212) (0.0537) (0.0510)
Freelance Self Employment 0.157 0.644 0.0648 -0.0238 0.100* -0.0384
(0.145) (0.400) (0.129) (0.254) (0.0609) (0.0614)
Migration
Foreigner 0.322*** 0.122 0.451***
(0.106) (0.138) (0.101)
Turkish Descent -0.0887 -0.429 -0.180
(0.222) (0.269) (0.211)
Phases of Promotion
Phase 1: No Promotion 0.138 -0.173 0.355 0.435 -0.362*** -0.296*** -0.377***
(0.255) (0.279) (0.265) (0.394) (0.0673) (0.0998) (0.0680)
Phase 2: Generous BA 0.0362 -0.537** 0.217 -0.329 -0.201*** -0.332*** -0.155**
(0.230) (0.219) (0.247) (0.265) (0.0646) (0.103) (0.0662)
Phase 3: Restricted BA
Interactions
Phase 1 * Foreigner 0.322* -0.167 0.246
(0.168) (0.231) (0.164)
Phase 2 * Foreigner -0.365*** -0.157 -0.407***
(0.127) (0.211) (0.134)
Phase 3 * Foreigner
Observations 1777 478 2035 578 2169 356 2525
Number of Individuals 575 167 578 167 712 180 718
Marginal effects presented.
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Reference
Reference
ReferenceReference
Reference
All
Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Random Effects
Initial SE Pooled SE + WE
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promotion. This is suggestive evidence that the BA may be effective at increasing 
incomes for foreigners, although the effect is not statistically significant. 
 
 Effects for natives suggest that in both the initial self-employment spell following 
unemployment, and once all ensuing spells are included, incomes are actually higher 
during the initial period of no promotion. Relative to the period of restricted usage of the 
BA, income for natives is marginally higher in more liberal periods of BA provision. This 
provides some further evidence that natives, unlike foreigners, are more successful when 
benefits are more generous. Furthermore, given that income for foreigners in phase three 
is positive relative to no promotion, the lack of similarly positive income effects for 
natives here is some more evidence of “catching-up” effects between immigrant and 
native incomes. Overall, it must be considered that many of these coefficients are 
statistically insignificant. 
 
 Table Eight also provides results for three random effects regressions run to 
answer this same question. The advantage of random effects models is that they 
incorporate both “within” and “between” variation in calculating the marginal impact of 
each covariate on income. However, these models are known to be very sensitive to 
omitted variables bias which may produce inconsistent results. Hausman tests are 
normally used to assess the consistency of these random effects models relative to their 
known-consistent fixed effects variants. However, such tests do not compute given that 
weights are utilized in this analysis. Random effects models are included, but these 
findings should be taken in light of their potential inconsistency.  
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 Columns (5) and (6) report random effects estimates for the initial phase of self-
employment following transition out of unemployment, as well as all ensuing wage-
employment spells. The random effects setup now allows for covariates that do not vary 
within an individual over time to be included. With this addition, effects are no longer 
aggregated separately for foreigners and natives. Instead, a complement of interaction 
terms is included in each regression. Because of the added sample size attained by 
pooling natives and foreigners, the model can now explicitly model wage income from all 
wage-employment spells that directly follow an initial self-employment spell post-
unemployment. A pooled random effects model for all spells post-unemployment (wage 
and self) is also included for comparison’s sake to the earlier fixed effects model. This is 
found in column (7). 
 
  For the covariates outside of the BA phase and foreigner framework, we see that 
demographic variables (like sex and married) excluded from the fixed effects framework 
now become significant predictors of income effects in these two regressions. Comparing 
the predictors of income between initial self-employment and ensuing wage employment 
spells demonstrates the highly distinct qualifications that are demanded of individuals in 
wage-employment over self-employment. For instance, having some college education is 
a strongly positive predictor of higher income in these ensuing wage spells, and previous 
work experience is also highly valued as a determinant of wage income. Living in West 
Germany, where more wage-employment jobs are available relative to the East, is also a 
highly significant positive predictor of income in ensuing wage spells.  
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 This analysis is mostly concerned with the interactions between the availability of 
self-employment benefits and foreigner status. Similar to the earlier survival analysis, 
several tables are created to compare income effects across phases and immigrant status 
based upon the various interaction and dummy terms included in these models. These 
comparisons are presented in Table Nine. For the initial self-employment spell, the 
complement of interaction terms and dummy variables are each mostly statistically 
significant, although as stated earlier, it is beyond the scope of this analysis to calculate 
the joint significance of each combined effect presented in Table Nine. However, the 
effects seen here confirm both the findings of the survival analysis and the fixed effects 
models presented in Table Eight. For the first self-employment spell following 
unemployment, both non-Turk foreigners and Turks make less money in phase two 
relative to phase three. This suggests, once again, that the BA has a positive effect on 
income for participants in its restricted form over its more liberal form, and that BA 
provision has positive income effects for foreigners overall. 
 
 The initial self-employment income effects for natives alone exhibit larger 
incomes for both periods of BA availability than in phase one, when no such benefits 
were available. However, in this instance, the random effects model predicts higher 
incomes in phase three for natives than in phase two. Although not entirely consistent 
with the survival analysis and fixed effects estimates for natives – that more liberal 
benefits lead to more employment stability – the limitations of random effects models 
must be considered when taking this finding into account. 
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 The relative gain in self-employment income from the initial period of no BA 
promotion to the third phase of restricted promotion is higher for natives than foreigners. 
However, foreigners still make more money than natives in phases one and three. This 
does not necessarily preclude these positive income effects for foreigners from helping 
them reach earnings parity with natives overall. Generally, this finding suggests that start-
up grants were effective for both natives and foreigners.  Relative to wage-employed 
natives outside of this sample (which solely includes the formerly unemployed), 
foreigners will likely exhibit a “catching-up” income effect as compared to such natives 
who do not benefit from government support. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 For wage-employment spells following the initial self-employment spell, 
estimates for the income of Turks and other foreigners relative to natives indicate similar 
trends as discovered for the initial entrepreneurial spell. For both wage-employment and 
the pooled regression, all groups (foreigners, Turks, natives) make less money in phase 
TABLE NINE: CALCULATION OF INCOME EFFECTS POST-UNEMPLOYMENT 
    
(Initial SE Spell, Random Effects)  
 Non-Turk Foreigner Turk Native 
Phase 1 0.282 0.1933 -0.362 
Phase 2 -0.244 -0.3327 -0.201 
Phase 3 0.322 0.2333 0 
    
(Ensuing WE Spell, Random Effects)  
 Non-Turk Foreigner Turk Native 
Phase 1 -0.341 -0.770 -0.296 
Phase 2 -0.367 -0.797 -0.332 
Phase 3 0.122 -0.307 0 
    
(Pooled SE+WE, Random Effects)   
 Non-Turk Foreigner Turk Native 
Phase 1 0.32 0.14 -0.377 
Phase 2 -0.111 -0.291 -0.155 
Phase 3 0.451 0.271 0 
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two compared to phase three. Overall, largely positive income effects are seen when 
incomes are compared from phase one to phase three. The relative increase in income 
from phase one to phase three is significantly larger for Turks and other foreigners 
compared to natives in wage-employment spells, mostly because income is significantly 
lower in these wage employment spells in the absence of previous BA receipt, relative to 
the income levels of other self-employment spells that occur in phase one. 
 
 These results suggest an important finding concerning the impact of BA provision 
on later transitions into employment. The BA appears to effectively utilize the self-
employment potential of foreigners to provide labor market experience that produces 
positive results when these individuals search for wage-paid jobs beyond those seen even 
in the initial self-employment spell. Although this effect is minimized when immigrants 
who find new self-employment post-initial start-up are included in the pooled regression, 
the net relative impact of these benefits is still larger in these secondary employment 
spells compared to initial self-employment. In other words, this suggests that BA 
provision has a positive and multiplicative effect on income for foreigners beyond the 
initial self-employment spell, and relative to natives.  
 
 What happens to wage-employment out of unemployment during these phases? 
 A final set of weighted panel data models is constructed to compare all 
individuals who left unemployment for self-employment with individuals leaving 
unemployment instead for wage employment. Fixed effects models for natives and 
foreigners rely upon individuals who have therefore transitioned out of unemployment 
into both self-employment and wage employment at various points in this eleven-year  
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time span. Effects are presented in Table Ten. 
TABLE TEN: EARNINGS OUT OF UNEMPLOYMENT, WAGE WORKERS AND SELF EMPLOYED 
 (1) (2) 
 Fixed Effects 
VARIABLES Natives Foreigner 
Demographic   
ln(Age) 3.467*** 1.066 
 (1.327) (2.154) 
Number of Children -0.100 -0.170* 
  (0.127) (0.0899) 
Labor Market   
Vocational Training 0.0216 0.0150 
 (0.196) (0.276) 
Work Experience -0.0491 -0.0124 
  (0.0461) (0.0792) 
Sector   
Mining 
 Reference 
Manufacturing 0.493*** 0.489*** 
 (0.163) (0.182) 
Blue Collar Service 0.528** 0.134 
 (0.205) (0.181) 
White Collar Service 0.301** 0.911** 
  (0.149) (0.377) 
Type of Self-Employment   
Self-Employed -1.078*** -0.486 
  (0.235) (0.400) 
Phases of Promotion   
Phase 1: No Promotion 0.629 -0.443 
 (0.410) (0.438) 
Phase 2: Generous BA 0.614 -0.221 
 (0.398) (0.354) 
Phase 3: Restricted BA 
  Reference 
Interactions   
Phase 1 * Self-Employed -0.563 0.345 
 (0.446) (0.524) 
Phase 2 * Self-Employed -0.678 -0.559 
 (0.484) (0.536) 
Phase 3 * Self-Employed 
 Reference 
   
Observations 2109 550 
Number of Individuals 706 205 
Marginal effects presented.   
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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 These models will hopefully indicate further evidence regarding the income effect 
of the BA for foreigners relative to natives, and shed further light on the negative self-
employment and earnings effects found in the generous phase of start-up promotion, 
phase two.  
 
 For natives in the fixed effects model, the raw impact of self-employment 
indicates that choosing self-employment out of unemployment may be less profitable for 
natives compared to wage-employment. However, for foreigners, this effect is not 
significant. Further phase effects can be determined by constructing tables displaying 
income effects relative to phase three wage employment, the reference category for these 
two regressions. Results for both foreigners and natives from calculations of the net 
effects of the dummy variables and interaction terms given above are shown in Table 
Eleven. 
  
 As before, the significance of these combined coefficients should be taken lightly, 
in that the statistical significance of each underlying dummy variable or interaction term 
is very limited. However, these findings can still be illustrative, especially to the extent to 
TABLE ELEVEN: CALCULATION OF INCOME EFFECTS POST-UNEMPLOYMENT (FIXED EFFECTS) 
  
(Natives, Fixed Effects)  
 Self-Employed Wage-Employed 
Phase1 -1.012 0.629 
Phase2 -1.142 0.614 
Phase3 -1.078 0 
   
(Foreigners, Fixed Effects)  
 Self-Employed Wage-Employed 
Phase1 -0.584 -0.443 
Phase2 -1.266 -0.221 
Phase3 -0.486 0 
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which they concur with previous assessments of the impact of each phase of BA 
provision on foreigners and natives. Estimates for foreigners demonstrate that the gap 
between the incomes of individuals choosing self-employment compared to wage-
employment is largest in phase two. This suggests the precise foreigner skill distribution 
effect presented throughout this paper, that in this period of very liberal and generous 
benefit provision, the average skill of individuals leaving unemployment for self-
employment decreases (as seen in the relative effect of phase two on the income of self-
employed foreigners in Table Eleven), and corresponding increases are seen in the 
relative skill distribution and/or labor market successes of the remaining foreigners who 
become wage-employed due perhaps to a decrease in labor supply. Although income for 
wage-employed foreigners in phase two relative to phase three is marginally lower, the 
absolute difference between the relative incomes of those entering wage versus self-
employment is correspondingly smaller.  For natives, the gap between wage income and 
self-employment income is actually largest for phase three. The divide for phase two is 
roughly equal to the gap in self-employment income and wage income in phase one 
without the impact of the BA.  
 
 These coefficients do demonstrate that wage-employment out of unemployment is 
largely more profitable than self-employment, which at first glance runs contrary to the 
central premise of this paper and previous studies that self-employment offers immigrants 
an opportunity to reach closer earnings parity to natives. However, studies that find near-
parity in earnings focus on all self-employed immigrants (see e.g. Constant, 1998), rather 
than those who become self-employed after a time spent in unemployment. Additionally, 
self-employment subsidization is alleged to be effective primarily for those laborers who 
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are difficult-to-employ in wage employment. As a result, the income of the difficult-to-
employ who choose self-employment is expected to be comparatively lower than the 
income of individuals who are successful in finding wage employment. Additionally, 
because these fixed effects models examine within-individual variation, it is possible that 
the incomes of wage-employed individuals exiting unemployment in phase three (the 
highest period of wage income for foreigners, are biased upwards by earlier experiences 
in subsidized self-employment.   
--------------- 
 This completes this paper’s empirical analysis of self-employment subsidies and 
immigrants. Through an examination of the conditional probability that foreigners and 
natives remain gainfully employed following start-up out of unemployment, as well as 
the income of foreigners and natives in all stages of employment post-start-up, several 
trends have developed regarding the overall effectiveness of the Bridging Allowance in 
integrating the unemployed into the economy, and how immigrants respond to these 
benefits. The next and final section will summarize these findings, focusing on the impact 
of the Bridging Allowance on the immigrant-native employment and earnings gap. 
Section Eight will conclude by making a policy recommendation based upon these 
empirical results and the preceding review of the literature for utilizing self-employment 
subsidies for immigrants in the future, along with avenues for further research into the 
matter. 
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SECTION EIGHT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 This comprehensive study began with a very basic observation for the German 
labor market, that immigrants in Germany operate at a disadvantage relative to natives. 
Immigrants in Germany, on average, exhibit increased unemployment, reduced earnings, 
and an increased uptake and dependence upon welfare and unemployment benefits 
relative to native Germans. After a survey of the literature on the immigrant-native 
employment gap in Germany, it is clear that these migrants suffer from socioeconomic 
and human capital deficiencies relative to native workers, which results in their increased 
uptake of public benefits compared to natives. Immigrants are not intrinsically more 
likely than natives to remain on these welfare or unemployment benefits, yet on average 
they do remain dependent upon state support for longer than natives as they face 
difficulties in finding employment to facilitate an efficient transition back into the labor 
market. 
 
 Although Germany’s strong welfare state has shown success in mobilizing the 
difficult-to-employ, it has scarcely focused or targeted its efforts on immigrants despite 
their prevalence as a large welfare constituency. The literature on mobilizing immigrants 
in Germany is growing, but has thus far focused primarily on short-term public 
employment programs and training, not self-employment. This paper proposes utilizing 
Germany’s complement of start-up subsidy programs to take advantage of an often-noted 
proclivity for immigrants to succeed in self-employment. In fact, immigrants in Germany 
have been found to overcome many of their struggles in the labor market via 
entrepreneurial activity, and at times are even able to reach earnings parity with 
comparable native Germans.  
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 Although a review of the German start-up subsidy literature provides reason to 
believe that such subsidies can indeed mobilize unemployed immigrants, little empirical 
or theoretical attention has been given thus far to this research question. The few start-up 
subsidy analyses that even consider differential effects of self-employment promotion for 
natives and immigrants do so incompletely. They predominantly treat citizenship as a 
proxy for immigrants, which ignores the large numbers of ethnic German migrants, 
naturalized guest-workers, and others in Germany who have become citizens since their 
arrival. This study is perhaps the first comprehensive empirical work to suggest and 
analyze the ability of public self-employment promotion to help adequately integrate 
unemployed foreign laborers back into contributory and productive roles within the 
German economy. 
 
 Using a set of exogenous policy changes within the provision of Bridging 
Allowance start-up benefits to unemployed individuals from 1983 to 1993, this study is 
able to ascertain the differential effects of these benefits on immigrants and natives. For 
all workers combined, this analysis finds marginally positive benefits of these subsidies 
in increasing the permanence and stability of employment for formerly unemployed 
workers. This marginal aggregate effect is consistent with previous analyses of the 
Bridging Allowance in its earliest years. However, once the effects of these benefits are 
broken down between immigrants and natives, an untold story develops which is absent 
from the previous literature on start-up subsidies. 
 
 This study finds that in periods where benefits are very generous and readily 
available to a wide complement of unemployed individuals, foreign laborers actually 
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perform worse as a result of these generous benefits than when the Bridging Allowance 
provides smaller benefits to fewer unemployed individuals. “Worse” in this context, is 
defined as exhibiting an increased probability that subsidized individuals will lapse out of 
gainful employment back into unemployment at any given point in time following initial 
start-up. Furthermore, foreigners are found in this analysis to, on average, receive lower 
income in self-employment out of unemployment in periods of generous start-up 
promotion by the welfare state. This study finds evidence that this phenomenon does not 
occur for native workers, but in fact is the opposite, that liberal and generous benefits 
lead to increased income and job stability after start-up receipt. Previous analyses of start-
up subsidies, notably Reize (2000) 1, offer generalized assessments of the impact of the 
generosity and availability of the Bridging Allowance and state rather explicitly that more 
generous benefits lead to more stable self-employment for subsidized individuals. This 
study has determined, however, that if effects are not broken down between immigrants 
and natives, such an assessment may inaccurately seem uniformly true across the whole 
spectrum of unemployed workers. If policy regarding the availability of start-up subsidies 
to immigrants is driven by this assertion, then it will actually lead to decreased average 
effects of these benefits for foreigners. 
 
 In assessing the impact of generous and readily available start-up benefits, it is 
apparent that such generous start-up capital is over-used by the unemployed immigrant 
population. This leads to increased average probabilities that subsidized start-ups will 
lapse back into unemployment, and reduced income for the average potential start-up 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Reize does find that phase three is more successful than phase two for all workers, but includes data through 1996 
outside of this study’s bounds. His “phase four” of BA provision is identified as the most liberal and the most 
generous, and in this phase he finds that workers achieve the largest success relative to phase three’s restrictive 
benefits. For a larger discussion of Reize (2000)’s findings, including a replication of his analysis broken down 
between natives and foreigners with largely different results, see the Appendix.  
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recipient.  Confirming this exodus of low-skilled foreigners into self-employment during 
the phase of generous Bridging Allowance support, the average income and job stability 
of foreigners who entered wage employment rather than a start-up actually increased.  
 
 In other words, many immigrants who lacked the sufficient skill to become 
successful in self-employment were incentivized to take-up these generous benefits 
nonetheless, entered self-employment financed almost solely by the government, and 
then quickly fell back onto state supported unemployment benefits once again. Unless the 
participation of these lower-skilled foreigners in generous benefit periods is taken into 
account, the overall benefit of start-up promotion for other highly skilled foreigners is 
understated. The fact that comparable effects for natives do not appear is consistent with 
the higher skill level and human capital characteristics of natives in the German labor 
market relative to immigrants.  
  
 Overall, in comparing the income growth for natives and foreigners in self-
employment across the phases of benefit provision, we see in this study some modest 
evidence of “catching-up” effects between immigrants and natives induced by this self-
employment subsidy. These findings suggest that self-employment subsidies for 
immigrants can be effective at closing the immigrant-native earnings gap. Despite 
immigrants’ adverse response to very generous benefits in phase two of Bridging 
Allowance provision, they are very effectively promoted by phase three’s modest and 
restricted benefits. In phase three, foreigners generally experience larger incomes relative 
to the null period of no start-up promotion compared to self-employed natives. This 
indicates that modest self-employment promotion is effective at mobilizing only the 
	   103	  
immigrants who are best able to succeed in self-employment, but may otherwise lack the 
financial means to do so. Furthermore, this study identifies clear empirical evidence that 
initial self-employment pays dividends in preparing foreigners to remain gainfully 
employed after participation. These findings are generally robust across different model 
specifications and comparison groups.  
  
 This paper is original in providing an assessment of the differential positive 
impact of these subsidies on foreigners, and will hopefully guide further research into 
immigrants and more recent start-up programs. The early Bridging Allowance provided 
no panacea to entirely reverse the labor market struggles of difficult-to-employ migrants. 
However, the review of the theoretical backing for immigrant self-employment 
subsidization and the empirical work provided in this paper suggest that the German 
welfare state should consider increased usage of self-employment subsidies for 
immigrants as a means to overcome their oft-stated persistence in unemployment.  
However, these benefits should be tailored to the precise stock of unemployed 
immigrants eligible for participation. Future start-up grants should avoid providing 
benefits that are too readily available to ill-prepared foreigners who may mistakenly 
believe that self-employment is the best avenue for their mobilization back into the labor 
market. This study’s empirical work determines that public funds are better served trying 
to mobilize these low-skilled immigrants in other, more effective ways that lead to lasting 
attachment to the labor market. Instead, modest or generous support should be restricted 
to those at the higher end of the skill distribution among the unemployed – those 
immigrant workers who would succeed in self-employment, but perhaps simply lack the 
start-up capital necessary to begin of their own accord.  
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 This type of special consideration and program design for foreign laborers is 
rarely seen in the efforts of German federal planners. However, this study predicts that 
such consideration would be effective in securing the labor market integration of many in 
this traditionally difficult-to-employ group, and would assist these disadvantaged 
immigrants in achieving closer income and employment parity with native workers.  
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SECTION TEN: APPENDIX 
 
 The primary purpose of this appendix is to discuss efforts made in this study to 
extend the analysis time beyond 1993 thereby including all available waves of the 
GSOEP through 2008. Unfortunately, as discussed in section six, the GSOEP stops 
identifying the exact transition dates in and out of self-employment for laborers from 
1994 onward. Confronted with that lack of data, this study utilized relevant employment-
related variables for each individual to “construct” self-employment spells despite the 
lack of explicit transitions given by the GSOEP. These related variables included the 
number of months each individual spent in wage employment and self-employment in the 
previous year, as well as data on last job end date, last job duration, and current job begin 
date. This method was able to identify a good proportion of self-employment spells with 
exact precision. 
 
 However, a non-marginal amount of self-employment spells could not be defined 
with exact precision based upon these same variables. In many cases, data on wage 
employment duration, self-employment duration, and last/current job end/begin dates was 
likely miscoded or incorrectly reported. Frequently, this data was entirely missing for 
observations in the dataset. As a result, a simple set of coding rules was applied to 
identify self-employment in the event of uncertainty over beginning and/or end dates. 
These coding rules were conservative in nature, such that if presented with an opportunity 
to identify self-employment in a manner which could artificially inflate the duration of 
employment post start-up, a placement was assumed which would minimize the duration 
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of that spell relative to later employment. 2  Where possible and only given uncertainty, 
surrounding yearly data was utilized to effectively gauge year-to-year transitions. The 
entire set of coding rules is lengthy and cumbersome, and will not be published here but 
is available upon request. 
 
 Using the surrounding employment data for each individual in the GSOEP and a 
series of conservative assumptions, self-employment spells were identified for every 
individual by month from 1994 to 2008. However, once compared to the distribution of 
self-employment for the known-to-be accurate spells in years 1983-1993, problems in the 
ability of this coding scheme to effectively identify actual self-employment spells began 
to emerge. Table A.1 describes the same distribution of self-employment spells based 
upon their origin as given earlier in the paper, this time through 2008.  
 
 This table shows a very marked decline in self-employment that rises out of 
unemployment beginning in 1994, as soon as the GSOEP ceases identifying exact 
monthly self-employment spells and the manual coding scheme takes over. Based upon 
1983-1993 trends, the conservative assumptions in this coding scheme appear to 
mistakenly attribute many self-employment spells that should rise out of unemployment 
instead to wage employment. A clear structural break exists between the self-employment 
data provided by the GSOEP, and any identification of self-employment spells able to be 
completed by the author in the face of measurement error, incomplete data, and general 
uncertainty in the 1994-2008 data.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 e.g., When it was clear that a self-employment spell and wage-employment spell occurred in direct succession but 
it was unclear which spell came first, it was assumed that wage-employment preceded self-employment rather than 
vice versa. 
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TABLE A.1: ORIGINS OF SELF-EMPLOYMENT 
Year Unemployment Wage-Employment OLF Spell Total 
1983 87 0 0 87 
1984 110 61 18 189 
1985 107 65 13 185 
1986 93 71 23 187 
1987 90 91 20 201 
1988 91 53 10 154 
1989 96 51 6 153 
1990 208 51 19 278 
1991 137 73 7 217 
1992 130 69 17 216 
1993 122 62 10 194 
1994 35 103 25 163 
1995 37 113 24 174 
1996 33 102 23 158 
1997 42 140 34 216 
1998 29 70 27 126 
1999 48 564 46 658 
2000 56 117 41 214 
2001 35 412 45 492 
2002 41 144 49 234 
2003 63 117 59 239 
2004 77 107 60 244 
2005 70 230 49 349 
2006 60 96 74 230 
2007 56 99 56 211 
Total 1,953 3,061 755 5,769 
  
 To assess further the degree to which the manual post-1993 coding scheme was 
able to identify self-employment spells effectively, this same coding rules were applied to 
the GSOEP data for 1983-1993 using the same related employment variables, and then 
compared to the spells actually identified by the GSOEP. This effort provided a 
counterfactual comparison between the coding scheme able to be constructed by the 
author given the uncertainty in the data, and the precise spells identified in the GSOEP 
for this period. Although not presented explicitly in this appendix, applying the coding 
scheme to this counterfactual period produced a distribution of self-employment spells 
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far similar to the distribution seen for 1994-2008 in Table A.1., and rather distinct from 
the precise values offered by the GSOEP.  
 
 To the extent made possible by the data, the author then attempted to reverse the 
conservative coding assumptions that worked against the hypothesis of this study but 
perhaps overstated the incidence of self-employment rising out of wage employment. In 
the face of uncertainty in the precise start or end date of a self-employment spell, it was 
then assumed, for example, that more spells rose out of unemployment, and that self-
employment preceded other employment if successive spells were identified (among 
other assumptions). After reversing these assumptions, however, the distribution of self-
employment from 1994-2008 exhibited only marginal convergence towards the trend 
established by the 1983-1993 sample. It is clear that the GSOEP is an imperfect dataset 
for identifying transitions into and out of self-employment on a micro level following 
1993. In fact, a cursory review of other non-start-up related literature that utilizes the 
GSOEP to analyze self-employment finds that such analyses focus almost solely on self-
employment lasting longer than one year, which is readily identifiable (see e.g. Block and 
Sandner, 2009). This initial search suggests that the GSOEP literature recognizes that 
short-term self-employment spells are too difficult to identify in this dataset. 
 
 Although the author’s coding scheme appears to identify between thirty and fifty 
percent of the self-employment spells out of unemployment predicted by the pre-1994 
trend, it is perhaps possible that the spells identified in this coding scheme remain 
somewhat representative of the entire set of self-employment spells out of 
unemployment. If this is true, inclusion of 1994-2008 self-employment spells would not 
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bias coefficient estimates for a similar analysis conducted in this paper. Table A.2 sheds 
some light on this matter, listing the average duration of self-employment spells which 
rise out of unemployment in each period, 1983-1993 and 1994-2008. 
TABLE A.2: AVERAGE DURATION IN SE OUT OF UE 
Group Observations Mean SD 
1983-1993 655 9.84 15.05 
1994-2008 297 30.91 38.01 
Total 952 16.41 26.47 
*Note: Values are in months.  
 
 The coding scheme for 1994-2008 identifies, as seen earlier, only a fraction of the 
expected total number of spells. More importantly, the average duration in months of the 
spells identified is almost thirty one, whereas the average duration of spells provided by 
the GSOEP for 1983-1993 is only ten months. The coding scheme appears to have 
succeeded in identified predominantly lengthy self-employment spells over short-term 
spells. This discrepancy presents a major problem to any survival analysis that pools 
1983-1993 and 1994-2008 self-employment. 
 
 Table A.3. replicates the survival analyses conducted for the 1983-1993 data 
earlier in this study, but now combines the self-employment spells identified by the 
author’s coding scheme and includes a dummy variable to control for these hypothesized 
structural differences between the sources of these two spells. In fact, this dummy 
variable is highly significant and several orders of magnitude larger than most other 
covariates. This strongly confirms the presence of structural differences in the self-
employment spells identified via manual coding from related variables compared to 
spells identified by GSOEP participants. Furthermore, the raw hazard ratios for phases 
four through six are all significant and distinct from the third phase of Bridging 
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Allowance provision. Once the 1983-1993 dummy’s results are added to the effects listed 
for phases one and two, it is readily apparent that self-employment in phases four through 
six exhibits a strikingly lower probability of lapsing back into unemployment than earlier 
spells.  
  
 Although it is possible that including a dummy variable to control for these 
structural differences may account for any resulting bias, this assumes that the structural 
differences present in the 1994-2008 data only warrant an intercept shift of the baseline 
hazard rate. A comparison of the coefficients reported in Table A.3. to those reported in 
the main portion of this study’s analysis reveal distortion effects in the significance, sign, 
and variance of separate parameter estimates that result from including this structurally 
different data. These discrepancies are simply too great to trust that the inclusion of 1994-
2008 data may not bias true estimates of the effects of the BA using1983-1993 data, even 
with a dummy control variable. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weibull Cox Weibull Cox
VARIABLES Hazard Ratio Hazard Ratio Hazard Ratio Hazard Ratio
Demographic
Sex 0.965 0.858** 0.918 0.817**
(0.0728) (0.0598) (0.0804) (0.0660)
ln(Age) 1.436** 1.229 1.388 1.206
(0.262) (0.167) (0.291) (0.189)
Savings Account 0.984 0.998 1.061 1.001
(0.0766) (0.00155) (0.101) (0.00252)
Labor Market
West Germany 1.237** 1.520*** 1.435*** 1.882***
(0.123) (0.149) (0.190) (0.243)
Vocational Training 0.739*** 0.994*** 0.625*** 0.991***
(0.0527) (0.00157) (0.0530) (0.00217)
Speaks German 0.695 0.983*** 0.569** 0.982***
(0.164) (0.00500) (0.138) (0.00511)
Work Experience 0.993 1.000 0.997 1.000
(0.00483) (7.80e-05) (0.00567) (0.000119)
Sector
Mining
Manufacturing 0.522*** 0.979*** 0.688*** 0.982***
(0.0616) (0.00354) (0.0891) (0.00432)
Blue Collar Service 0.556*** 0.987*** 0.731*** 0.991***
(0.0493) (0.00202) (0.0727) (0.00264)
White Collar Service 0.437*** 0.985*** 0.489*** 0.984***
(0.0420) (0.00207) (0.0571) (0.00304)
Type of Self-Employment
Family-Based Self Employment 0.325*** 1.002 0.307*** 1.000
(0.0751) (0.00492) (0.0753) (0.00580)
Self Employed with Employees 0.242*** 0.982*** 0.249*** 0.980***
(0.0222) (0.00237) (0.0261) (0.00303)
Freelance Self Employment 0.550*** 0.997* 0.589*** 0.999
(0.0493) (0.00189) (0.0603) (0.00274)
Migration
Foreigner 0.966 1.063 0.881 0.951
(0.138) (0.154) (0.133) (0.146)
Turkish Descent 0.588** 0.555** 0.326*** 0.320***
(0.145) (0.133) (0.121) (0.117)
Coding Control
1983-1993 Dummy 5.998*** 4.080*** 3.929*** 1.014***
-0.816 (0.629) (0.643) (0.00297)
Phases of Promotion
Phase 1: No Promotion 0.854 1.074 0.825* 1.063
-0.095 (0.119) (0.0955) (0.121)
Phase 2: Generous BA 0.873 0.977 0.826 0.997
-0.101 (0.114) (0.0990) (0.120)
Phase 3: Restricted BA
Phase 4: Most Generous BA 2.782*** 2.110*** 2.869*** 0.821
(0.440) (0.360) (0.894) (0.227)
Phase 5: BA and Ich-AG 3.263*** 2.398***
(0.579) (0.463)
Phase 6: Einstiegsgeld 3.205*** 2.208**
(1.106) (0.778)
Interactions
Phase 1 * Foreigner 0.961 0.852 1.013 0.943
-0.214 (0.187) (0.233) (0.212)
Phase 2 * Foreigner 1.247 1.160 1.329 1.248
-0.288 (0.269) (0.317) (0.298)
Phase 3 * Foreigner
Phase 4 * Foreigner 0.569* 0.518* 1.943 1.369
(0.192) (0.174) (1.150) (0.802)
Phase 5 * Foreigner 1.353 1.050
(0.461) (0.353)
Phase 6 * Foreigner 2.155 1.170
(1.459) (0.788)
Constant 0.0132*** 0.0226***
(0.00936) (0.0181)
Observations 6708 6708 3722 3722
SE in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1983-2008 1983-1996
Reference
Reference
Reference
Reference
Reference
Reference
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Replicating Reize (2000)’s Findings 
 This study uses the same phase-based approach for analyzing Bridging Allowance 
provision as first offered by Reize (2000). Reize’s analysis runs from 1983 through 1996, 
three years into the period of time in which the GSOEP does not explicitly identify 
beginning and end dates for self-employment. For this and the previously discussed 
problems with post-1994 self-employment identification, Reize’s findings are not 
replicated as part of the main analysis in this paper. However, it is important to note with 
regards to the ultimate conclusion of this study that, although Reize contends that more 
generous BA provision will lead to overall higher job stability for recipients, his finding 
is based upon an analysis of a fourth phase of liberal provision of the BA which occurs 
outside of the sample used in this study. He argues that benefits in this fourth phase are 
even more generous and readily available than in phase two.  
 
 In fact, for native Germans and “foreigners”, Reize does find higher positive 
effects on job stability in phase three self-employment (out of unemployment) than in 
phase two. This corresponds with the relative relationship between phase two job stability 
and phase three job stability found for foreigners in the body of this study, and appears to 
suggest a similarly negative relationship between the skill of those entering subsidized 
self-employment and the generosity of the subsidies. None of these effects are discussed 
in Reize’s analysis; however, they can be seen in the displayed results of his survival 
analysis. 
 
 Reize’s study therefore positions rather awkwardly within the findings of this 
analysis. His results suggest that phase two generous benefits are somehow substantively 
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different from phase four generous benefits, to the extent that laborers respond favorably 
to phase four but adversely to phase two, all relative to restricted BA availability in phase 
three. This result seems counterintuitive, but is worthy of greater consideration in this 
appendix. If Reize’s findings are robust to the same specifications used in this paper, then 
it suggests that cutting off the scope of this analysis in 1993 provides a myopic view of 
the full effects of self-employment promotion on immigrants and natives.  
 
 A closer examination of Reize’s analysis reveals several methodological 
differences between his findings and those of this study. Although it is not readily 
apparent in the setup to his analysis, it appears that Reize does not include wage-
employment or ensuing distinct self-employment spells that immediately follow the 
subsidized start-up when conducting this survival analysis. Reize utilizes a reduced form 
population averaged model to estimate survival effects, unlike in this study. His sample 
size is only 87 spells of self-employment in this period, yet this analysis has identified 
1271 spells of self-employment post-unemployment through 1993 alone, and an 
additional 105 spells through coding self-employment manually from 1994 through 1996. 
Reize himself states that “coefficients and standard errors are quite large because of the 
small cell sizes and should therefore be interpreted carefully” (23). Reize does not 
include a discussion of how he identifies these 87 spells, but does state early on that 
“self-employment spells can be generated using the yearly information on job status 
as well as the beginning date of the job” (16). This does not reflect any of the 
difficulties in accurately identifying self-employment spells in the GSOEP after 1993 
found by the author of this study. 
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 Although Reize includes a “foreigner” variable in his survival analysis, he 
does not specify whether this includes naturalized immigrants such as former ethnic 
German migrants and guest-workers. Furthermore, his reduced form estimates do not 
include explicit interaction terms between “foreigner” status and each phase of self-
employment promotion. As a result, the precise variation within foreigner’s responses 
to generous benefits identified in Reize’s study is dampened, and the results of his 
analysis on native workers actually reflect portions of the variation more properly 
attributed to foreigners. Table Six in the body of this current analysis indicates that 
for phase two especially, these interaction terms are significant or near-significant 
across Weibull and Cox specifications, and that in hazard ratio form, they are large in 
magnitude and positive. This suggests that foreigners are more likely than natives in 
phase two to lapse back into unemployment, and that natives in phase two are actually 
less likely to lapse back into unemployment than in phase three. The lack of 
interaction terms in Reize’s analysis may bias his findings regarding the impact of 
phase four as well. 
 
 This analysis attempts briefly to replicate Reize’s analysis by including three 
waves of self-employment spell data after 1993 identified by the manual coding 
scheme. Given the earlier discussion of measurement uncertainty in these data and 
structural differences between the average duration of spells from 1994-1996 and 
1983-1993, this effort is reasonably imperfect yet still illustrative. To the extent that 
these structural differences can be minimized and controlled, a dummy variable for 
1983-1993 self-employment is included in the analysis. These results are listed in the 
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last two columns of Table A.3, and the customary summary of relative effects based 
upon interaction terms is presented in Table A.4. Interpretation of these interaction 
terms is complicated by the 1983-1993 dummy variable in that phase three of BA 
provision actually extends through portions of 1994. However, results are presented 
where each phase three relative effect includes the pre-93 dummy variable’s effects. 
Phase three estimates presented below are therefore likely biased upward given the 
impact of the positive pre-93 dummy on only a portion of spells in this phase.  Effects 
are therefore shown relative to phase three native estimates, but are not centered 
around zero.  
TABLE A.4: CALCULATION OF INTERACTION EFFECTS 
     
(Weibull Specification)    
 Non-Turk Foreigners Turks Natives  
Phase 1 2.648 1.974 2.754  
Phase 2 2.965 2.291 2.755  
Phase 3 2.81 2.136 2.929 * 
Phase 4 2.693 2.019 1.869  
     
(Cox Specification)    
 Non-Turk Foreigners Turks Natives  
Phase 1 -0.029 -0.709 0.077  
Phase 2 0.21 -0.47 0.011  
Phase 3 -0.035 -0.715 0.014 * 
Phase 4 0.141 -0.539 -0.179  
     
 *Estimates likely biased upward due to differential impact 
of the pre-93 dummy within this phase.  
 
 These relative effects paint a near identical picture to what is described in the 
current study. Turks and other foreigners are more likely to lapse back into 
unemployment during periods of generous benefits once the upward bias of phase 
three is taken into account for the Weibull specification. This phenomenon is even 
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clearer in the Cox specification even without the indications of upward bias. The Cox 
specification, as distinct from the Weibull estimation of the baseline hazard is known 
to be more consistent. For natives in both specifications, the generosity of benefits is 
indeed correlated with a reduced probability of lapsing back into unemployment in 
the exact manner predicted by this study.  
 
 This analysis explains the peculiarities of Reize’s findings in comparison to 
this study. Reize finds that phase four self-employment leads to the greatest effect on 
reducing the probability of lapsing back into unemployment relative to other phases, 
yet does not find similar effects for the other generous benefit phase two. Table A.4. 
explains that once foreigner-specific phase effects are taken into account, BA support 
to natives in phase two is also more beneficial when compared to restricted benefit 
provision. Furthermore, this analysis affirms the alternative story for foreigners that 
more generous benefits still lead to higher average probabilities that foreigners will 
lapse back into unemployment post-start-up. This effect even holds true for foreigners 
in phase four, despite Reize’s strong evidence of decreased probability of lapsing 
back into unemployment as a result of phase four’s generous benefits. Although the 
statistical significance of these relative effects is not presented here and is likely low, 
the similarities between these findings and those of this present study are still highly 
demonstrative.  
